Aircraft hydraulic power system diagnostic, prognostics and health management by Wang, Jian
  
 
 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
WANG JIAN 
 
 
 
 
AIRCRAFT HYDRAULIC POWER SYSTEM  
DIAGNOSTICS, PROGNOSTICS AND HEALTH MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING 
MSc by Research 
 
 
 
 
MSc 
Academic Year: 2011 - 2012 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Craig Lawson 
January 2012   
 
 

  
 
CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING 
MSc by Research 
 
 
MSc  
 
 
Academic Year 2011 - 2012 
 
 
WANG JIAN 
 
 
 
Aircraft Hydraulic Power System  
Diagnostics, Prognostics and Health Management 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Craig Lawson 
January 2012 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Science  
 
© Cranfield University 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this 
publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the 
copyright owner. 

i 
ABSTRACT 
This Individual Research Project (IRP) is the extension research to the group design 
project (GDP) work which the author has participated in his Msc programme. The GDP 
objective is to complete the conceptual design of a 200-seat, flying wing civil airliner—
FW-11. The next generation aircraft design demands higher reliability, safety and 
maintainability.  
With the development of the vehicle hydraulic system technology, the equipment and 
systems become more and more complex, their reliability and maintenance become 
more difficult for designers, manufacturers and customers. To improve the mission 
reliability and reduce life cycle cost, there is strong demand for the application of health 
management technology into airframe system design.  
In this research, the author introduced diagnostic, prognostic and health management 
(DPHM) concept into the aircraft hydraulic power system development. As a brand new 
technology, it is a challenge to apply the DPHM techniques to on-board system. Firstly, 
an assumed hydraulic power system was designed for FW-11 by the author and used as 
the case in his IRP research. Then the crucial components and key parameters needed to 
be monitored were obtained based on Function Hazard Analysis and Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis of this system. The writer compared a few diagnostic and prognostic 
methods in detail, and then selected suitable ones for a hydraulic power system. A 
diagnostic process was applied to the hydraulic power system using a Case-based 
reasoning (CBR) approach, whilst a hybrid prognostic method was suggested for the 
system. After that, a diagnostic, prognostic and health management (DPHM) 
architecture of the hydraulic power system was designed at system level based on the 
diagnostic and prognostic research. The whole research work provided a general and 
practical instruction for hydraulic system design by means of DPHM application. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis consists of the Individual Research Project (IRP) and a Group Design 
Project (GDP) in which the author has participated during the current academic year. 
The GDP is to design a Flying wing civil aircraft—FW-11 which, in its conceptual 
phase, is a long range, 250-seat, next generation airliner. The IRP is an extension 
research of the GDP, which aims to incorporate diagnostics, prognostics and health 
management (DPHM) concepts into the FW-11 hydraulic power system. The research 
also contributes to the design target of the GDP work.  
In this chapter, the background and problem statement are presented first to demonstrate 
the purpose of this project. It is followed by the research objectives and methodology of 
this thesis.  
1.2 Background  
An aircraft’s hydraulic power system is one of the essential secondary power systems 
which transfer mechanical energy from engines to actuators by pressurised fluid. 
Hydraulic power for aircraft first appeared in the 1930s and has remained an effective 
solution for over seventy years. With the development of hydraulic system technologies, 
the equipment and systems have become increasingly complex. This means in turn that 
system fault detecting and failure predicting is complex. At the same time, new 
investment in research and development has resulted in the intensification of 
competition in the civil aviation market. To gain a competitive advantage, future aircraft 
design aims for improved reliability and safety. The DPHM technology is a new 
philosophy in airframe systems design which aims to scientifically improve system 
reliability and maintainability. It can also enhance economic efficiency in the product 
life-cycle.  
The Health Management concept is the capability to make appropriate decisions about 
maintenance actions based on real-time monitoring, diagnosis and prognosis 
information, available resources, and operational demand [1]. The main functions of 
PHM technique incorporate three aspects: Real-time monitoring, Diagnostics and 
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Prognostics. The first primarily aims to acquire system or components status by 
advanced sensor technologies and related software in real time. Diagnostic is a fault 
identification and failure detection process based on the monitoring parameters and 
historgraphic data. The Prognosis process predicts the state of health and remaining life 
or the appropriate operating time span of systems and components. From the “Engine 
monitoring system” of the A-7 in the 1970s to the JSF PHM application in recent years, 
prognostics and health management (PHM) techniques have gradually developed into a 
complete concept. Figure 1-1 shows a typical DPHM functional flow. 
 
Figure 1-1: A typical functional flow of a DPHM system [2] 
1.3 Status and Questions  
With new technologies such as Fly-by-Wire, Electric Air Conditioning and 
Electromechanical Actuator (EMA) applied to aircraft systems, traditional energy 
systems, including hydraulic power, faced greater challenges. It can be seen from more 
and more publications and sci-tech articles that aircraft will incorporate more-electric 
systems and even all-electric system instead of hydraulically powered systems. This 
will undoubtedly simplify the system architecture and reduce system failure modes. 
Currently, neither the Airbus A380 nor Boeing B787, those new generation airplanes, 
can operate without a hydraulic power system. [3][4]In current technical conditions, 
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hydraulic power has significant advantages because of its higher power to weight ratio, 
especially in large power actuation mechanisms. [25] However, how is the position of 
hydraulic power in aircraft system to be maintained? How can we reduce the hydraulic 
power system failure rate to improve aircraft safety and reliability? How can we detect 
potential hydraulic hardware faults and failures and avoid catastrophic accidents? How 
can the maintenance workload be simplified to reduce life cycle costs? 
There is, therefore, a strong demand for the incorporation of prognostic and health 
management technology into aircraft hydraulic power systems. 
1.4 Research Objectives and Scope 
This research aims to develop a prognostic and health management approach to a flying 
wing aircraft hydraulic power system as an extension of the Group Design Project 
(GDP). Aircraft systems with PHM technology will make the new airliner designed in 
the GDP more competitive in a future aviation market. 
The GDP design process was divided into three phases. For the each phase, the task and 
objective were as follow: 
 Phase-I: Data collection and market analysis to establish specific design 
requirements 
 Phase-II: Utilize existing aircraft design methods to complete a conventional 
aircraft conceptual design as a baseline 
 Phase-III: Develop a flying wing aircraft for comparison with the baseline to 
see the benefits and challenges of the new concept 
By means of individual research as part of this thesis, the appropriate PHM methods for 
the hydraulic system had to be studied in depth. The following objectives will be 
achieved through this research: 
 Understanding development, status and the main function of PHM. 
 Familiarisation with the characteristics and operational principles of different 
diagnostics and prognostic methods.  
 To design a hydraulic power system for the FW-11 aircraft. 
 To establish the main failure modes of the hydraulic power system through 
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safety analysis.  
 Use of appropriate diagnostic and prognostic methods in hydraulic power 
system design.  
 To design a suitable DPHM architecture for the hydraulic power system based 
on its features and the above approaches. 
Therefore, this research first focuses on designing a hydraulic power system for the FW-
11 aircraft. Then the studies concentrate on the main functions of DPHM—— 
diagnostic and prognostic approaches and the concept of DPHM framework building. 
Nevertheless, the signal detection and measurement techniques, such as sensors and 
probes, are less involved in this thesis due to limited time. The whole research work 
aims to improve the hydraulic power system design by means of DPHM application. 
1.5 Methodology 
In Group Design Project, 22 students work as a team to finish the conceptual design of 
FW-11aricraft. In this phase, the author mainly contributed to the mass estimations and 
landing gear design of the aircraft. A summary of the GDP work and the author’s 
contributions are presented in Appendix A. 
In the IRP research, the author attempts to develop a generic DPHM methodology for 
aircraft hydraulic power systems. 
A literature review of PHM technologies will be given at first, which includes the 
histories and status of PHM, PHM functions and PHM methods classification.  
Then the author will establish an hydraulic power system architecture for the FW-11 
aircraft as a case study .The system function will then be briefly described. 
Prior to the application work of DPHM, a set of safety analysis methods are employed 
to determine which components and system parameters are essential. Functional hazard 
Assessment (FHA) is conducted for the whole system to identify hazardous function 
failure conditions and associated hazard levels. The failure modes effect and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) will be performed for each component of the hydraulic power 
system to identify the critical components and their potential failure modes. Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) for the selected failure modes which have higher hazard levels is 
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carried out in order to determine the possible cause and the probabilities of failure. All 
of these analyses are the fundamentals of the following work. 
Based on the analyses results, suitable diagnosis and prognosis methods are chosen for 
the appropriate components of the hydraulic power system. The diagnostic and 
prognostic applications are then the subject of research and in-depth discussion 
The hydraulic power system DPHM architecture is included in the next chapter. It is the 
integration of the above diagnostics and prognostics research and the interface between 
the hydraulic power system and the aircraft level IVHM system.  
Finally, the conclusions of all research work and future work are discussed. 
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2 Literature review  
2.1 PHM Technology History and Status 
PHM technology, such as Built-in test (BIT), diagnostics, condition-based maintenance 
and prognostic, has been incorporated in industrial applications since the 1970s. As a 
typical milestone of early PHM technology, the Engine Monitoring System was applied 
to the A-7 in the mid 1970’s. “Recently, stringent advanced diagnostic, prognostics, and 
health management capability requirements have begun to be placed on some of the 
more sophisticated new applications.” [6] 
The evolution of aircraft system health management technology developed by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA is shown below. 
Table 2-1 Evolution of Health Management Technologies [7] 
 
The table shows health management developed from system test and monitoring 
technologies. In the early stages, aircraft fault diagnosis relied mainly on ground testing. 
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However, faults could not be precisely detected due to the limitations of measurement 
instrumentation and methods. Some failure mode will not recur during ground operation. 
Modeling and simulation were applied in fault analysis from the 1960s, but aircraft 
testing was still carried out externally.  
When BIT was employed in avionic systems in the 1970s, system monitoring and fault 
diagnosis was brought to an on-board stage. In the next decade, BIT techniques were 
incorporated into different aircraft systems. At the same time, testability, reliability and 
maintainability were put onto the same level as system design. Testability was 
considered as a separate discipline which can be seen in MLT -STD-2165 issued by 
United States Department of Defense in 1985. 
Over the last twenty years, sensing techniques, diagnostic and prognostic methods have 
made significant progress. In 1993 ARINC first introduced the guidance of on-board 
Maintenance Systems (OMS) design. Subsequently the application of Condition-based 
maintenance (CBM) and PHM brought a revolution in aircraft maintenance, which was 
adopted in the Boeing 747-400 airplanes and F-35 respectively. 
Currently, the PHM system adopted on the F-35 is a comprehensive set of diagnostics, 
prognostic and health management capabilities. From the architecture shown in the 
following figure, we can see that the PHM on the F-35 includes two parts: on-board 
PHM and off-board PHM. [8] The on-board PHM system provides air vehicle 
information monitoring and management for airframe, mission system etc. It also 
provides logistics support for the end-user and makes the JSF fleet communicate with 
the joint distribution information system (JDIS) off-board, which helps the maintainers 
to make decisions and plan on-ground maintenance [9].  
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Figure 2-1: F-35 PHM Architecture [8] 
2.2 PHM Function and Benefits  
Generally, PHM systems incorporate functions of condition monitoring, state 
assessment, fault or failure diagnostics, failure progression analysis, prognostics, and 
maintenance support [10]. As Figure 2-2 shows, the diagnostics and prognostics are the 
main component of a PHM application.  
Diagnosis is the process of detecting or inferring the cause of any abnormal or 
unexpected behaviour of a component, or a system, or the failure of an aircraft to 
perform its function(s) .Generally, it is based on automated detection and judgment 
logic. The sources of any failure or fault related to the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) can 
be found by diagnosis. Diagnostic applications make use of system information from 
the design phase, such as FHA, FMECA, FTA and testability analysis [10]. 
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Figure 2-2 A typical PHM cycle [6] 
Prognosis is the ability to predict accurately and precisely the remaining useful life of a 
failing component or subsystem [6]. Aircraft prognostic systems incorporate an 
evolution capability of on-board prediction. Compared to a ground station, data 
processing with on-board prognostic will eliminate the potential for data dropout or 
incorrect processing.  
A modern and comprehensive PHM system for aircraft will greatly increase mission 
reliability and safety. Meanwhile, aircraft downtime will be reduced significantly due to 
improved maintainability. It can also be of benefit for both operational and support and 
life-cycle cost reduction as well as safety improvement [6]. 
The following lists the benefits of PHM applications:[6][11] 
 Provide advance warning of system failure 
 Less interruption of mission schedule 
 Time saving for inspections  
 Improve fault detection ability 
 Make the change of maintenance philosophy: from the “On failure or per 
schedule” to “on condition”. 
 Reduce testing equipment and ground support 
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  Simplify the maintainer training program 
 Life-cycle cost reduction 
2.3 Classification of diagnostics technologies 
A typical diagnostics process can be described as in the following diagram. Firstly the 
system or components operational information is obtained through observation. Then 
the observational data is processed by comparison to the expected behavior. Finally the 
diagnosis result is given by the diagnostic reasoning engine. 
Currently widely-used diagnostic technologies will be described individually in the 
following section. And there will be a comparison to discuss their particular advantages 
and drawbacks. 
According to Ann Patterson-Hine [12], rule-based expert systems, case-based reasoning 
(CBR), model-based reasoning (MBR), learning systems and probabilistic reasoning are 
described as representative of diagnostic approaches.  
 
Figure 2-3 General process of diagnosis [12] 
Referring to G. Vachtsevanos’s book [6], the available techniques can typically be 
divided into two main categories: model-based and data-driven methods. As shown in 
Fig.2-4 [6], the model-based method can be used for unforeseen faults diagnosis but 
must begin with an accurate model. Although a data-driven method is normally used in 
detecting anticipated faults only, there is no model needed in data processing. 
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Figure 2-4 Model-based and data-driven diagnosis techniques [6] 
Different authors use different classifications of diagnosis techniques. After a 
comprehensive consideration, a brief introduction of the following four commonly used 
methods will be given. 
2.3.1 Rule-based Expert System 
These methods are mainly used when there is a lack of specific physical properties for 
the diagnostic object but expertise is available from historical experiences. The “rule” 
used in expert system can be described simply as “if the fault symptom is observed, 
then action is required.” Figure 2-5 shows the reasoning chaining of rule-based expert 
system. If the observed facts match one established rule from the rule database, the 
diagnosis is simple and direct. A set of conflicts will arise when more than one rule 
matches. Then a pre-determined strategy will determine which rule has priority and is 
applied in the diagnostic results. 
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Figure 2-5 reasoning chaining of rule-based expert system [12] 
2.3.2 Case-Based Reasoning  
The reasoning engine of a case-based reasoning system (CBR) solves new problems by 
reference to solutions used in previous problems [6]. Similarly to rule-based systems, 
CBR utilize the experience of system behavior to build a case library. This method is 
mainly used in cases where the problem areas are difficult to understand. A basic CBR 
cycle is presented in the following chart, and the diagnostic process can be divided into 
four steps:  
 Retrieve —— retrieve the best or the most similar past case for the new 
problem. 
 Reuse —— attempt to solve the problem using the selected old case. 
 Revise —— modify the proposed solution if it cannot solve the new 
problem.  
 Retain —— the modified solution will be incorporated into the case-base as 
a new solution. 
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Figure 2-6 Case-based Reasoning System cycle [13] 
2.3.3 Model-Based Reasoning 
A model-based reasoning (MBR) system primarily detects fault symptoms by 
comparing the observed data with the expected data predicted by modeling. This is 
more suitable for dynamic systems fault diagnosis. Typically, MBR diagnostics 
technology can be illustrated as in figure 2-7. The input signals are processed through 
the physical system in parallel with the system model. Then the observed output signals 
are compared with the predicted signals from modeling. Discrepant result will imply the 
occurrence of faults. 
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Figure 2-7 A Model-based Reasoning approach [6] 
2.3.4 Learning Systems 
Learning systems can be data-driven diagnosis approaches, which are derived directly 
from routinely system operational data. [12] In which, the characteristics of the 
statistical data are assumed stably, except when an unanticipated failure occurs in the 
system. The data-driven methods have ability to transform the high-dimensional noisy 
data into lower-dimensional information when fault detection and diagnosis decisions 
making. The main disadvantage of learning systems is that their efficacy and accuracy is 
highly relays on the quantity and quality of monitored system operating data. 
2.4 Classification of Prognostic Technologies 
Prognostics can be considered as diagnostic capabilities updates, which work to assess 
the current health of the system and predict its remaining life by monitoring system 
operating features or the results of diagnostics. Prognosis techniques are important for 
improving safety, mission reliability and maintainability. Currently, there are many 
prognostic techniques used in various industrial fields. Most prognostic methods fall 
into the following three categories: 
2.4.1 Model-based Prognostic 
The model-based prognosis techniques predict the condition of system health by 
checking the observed signals of the real system against the simulation results of a 
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system model. In this case an accurate mathematical model is absolutely necessary. A 
typical example of model-based prognostic approach is given in Figure 2-8. 
These approaches have the advantage that they have the ability to incorporate physical 
models into the remaining useful life (RUL) of system estimation even if there is a lack 
of measurable events. The accuracy of prediction will accordingly increase as the 
system degradation features understanding improves. 
 
Figure 2-8 A typical example of Model-based prognostic approach [15] 
2.4.2 Probability-based Prognostics 
Probability-based prognosis methods establish the change in parameters and the 
probability of failure damage model through historical data, and then determine the 
system health status and trend analysis by comparing the detected abnormal key 
parameters with that of the current probability space of multi-parameter state .Compared 
to the model-based methods which rely on mathematical equations, less information 
required in probabilistic-based prognosis which is based on various probability density 
functions (PDFs). Meanwhile, these PDFs are easily abstracted by statistics from 
experimental or historical data. Figure 2-9 illustrates the schematic diagram of this 
method. 
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Figure 2-9 Probability-based prognostic approach [16] 
2.4.3 Data-driven Prediction Approach 
Data-driven methods are used in some situations where the prediction model is not 
easily established through statistical data or it is too expensive to do so. In such cases, a 
nonlinear network approach provided by Data-driven prognostic can produce the 
required output data. Nonlinear networks mainly include the neural network and fuzzy-
logic systems. 
Artificial neural network (ANN) is an interconnected group of nodes that maps complex 
features or fault indicators to their respective fault modes [6]. This is an artificial 
intelligence technology inspired by the function and structure of biological neural 
networks [14]. ANN tools are usually applied in non-linear statistical data modeling as 
they can model complex relationships between inputs and outputs.  
A typical fault prognosis scheme by ANN is shown in Fig.2-10. Compared to single 
direction or simple layer logical prognosis, ANN is better at multi input and output and 
systems prognostics even those which have multi-directional feedback. Overall, 
algorithms are used to determine how the function is organized in the system 
programme. Meanwhile, artificial neural networks have the ability to become learning 
systems which can be self taught by rule base or learned from input. 
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Figure 2-10 The ANN prognostic paradigm [6] 
The main advantage of data driven approaches is that they can often be applied more 
quickly and cheaply than other methods. The main disadvantage is that there are greater 
demands of data training before employing a prognostics approach. 
2.5 Summary 
A set of diagnostic methods and prognostic approaches has been described in the 
previous section. Each method has its own advantages in some areas while having 
drawbacks in other fields. For diagnostics, the advantages and disadvantages of each 
method have been summarized as shown in table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 Advantages and disadvantages of diagnostics methods [17] 
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For prognostic approaches, the range of system applicability and the cost of applying 
different methods are illustrated in Figure 2-11. As the accuracy of the different 
prognostics methods improves, the scope of application decreases and the costs increase. 
 
Figure 2-11 Prognostic technical approaches [6] 
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3 Hydraulic Power System Functional and Failure 
Modes Analysis  
According to the research objectives, a hydraulic power system will be designed in 
preliminary phase for the FW-11 aircraft which has been finished the conceptual design 
in the GDP. All research in this thesis is based on this hydraulic system. In this chapter, 
hydraulic power system architecture and functional description will be given firstly. 
Then a set of safety analyses for this system will be performed in order to ascertain the 
critical components and their associated parameters. 
3.1 FW-11 Hydraulic Power System Design 
The FW-11 aircraft is a designed as a next generation new configuration airliner, with a 
range of 7500nm and 250-seat capacity. The maximum take-off weight and range are 
similar to the Airbus 330 and Boeing 767-200ER. To compete with those aircraft, the 
FW-11 adopts a new configuration and new technology to make it more competitive. A 
hydraulic power system is defined as a secondary power system, in which, pressurized 
fluid is used to drive actuation mechanisms, thus providing a source of energy to the 
user system. PHM technology application in the hydraulic system will provide better 
maintainability and reduced operating costs.  
3.1.1 Design Requirement 
The FW-11 is a twin-engine flying wing airliner which will be in service in the 2020s. 
As an indication of future trends it can be seen that more-electric systems will be 
applied on aircraft such as the B777 and A380. These requirements together with the 
type of aircraft, determine the design of a hydraulic system. [25] The following three 
aspects are considered for the design requirement in this phase: 
a) Safety and reliability consideration 
For safe flight, three channel subsystems ensure that the hydraulic system includes 
sufficient redundancy. Meanwhile, the hydraulic power system design for FW-11 needs 
to meet the airworthiness requirements of FAA, EASA and CAAC. [22][23][24]   
b) Functional requirements 
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Hydraulic power is widely used for a variety of functions in most aircraft today, such as 
flight controls, undercarriage operating mechanical, braking and gear steering 
mechanisms. The control surface configuration of FW-11 is shown in Figure 4-1. As a 
more-electric aircraft, the GDP work assumes that the flaps and wheel brake use electric 
power. Electrical-Hydrostatic Actuators (EHAs) or the Electromechanical Actuators 
(EMAs) are employed for flaps control. The conventional hydraulically actuated brake 
system is replaced by an E-Brake Suite, which operates with electro-mechanically 
actuated brakes and electronic motor actuation control units. [31] 
 
Figure 3-1 FW-11 control surface 
At present, the functions which need be powered by the hydraulic system are as follows:  
 Flight controls 
 Aileron 
 Split Drag Rudder 
 Elevator 
 Utility systems 
 Landing Gear  
 Nosewheel steering 
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 Thrust Reversers 
 Cargo doors 
c) Economical efficiency consideration 
The FW-11design aims to provide enhanced economical efficiency in future civil 
aircraft markets. Higher pressure can significantly reduce component-size which in turn 
means significant weight saving. 
3.1.2 Hydraulic System Architecture 
After comprehensive consideration, the hydraulic power system schematic is depicted in 
Figure 3-2. 
There are three independent sub-systems (LEFT, RIGHT and CENTRE) in the FW-11 
aircraft hydraulic power system. The three systems operate continuously and power the 
customs at a pressure of 5000 psi.  
The LEFT or RIGHT system is pressurized by one Engine Driven Pump (EDP) and one 
Electric Motor Pump (EMP). In the Centre system, two large power EMPs operate as 
the main power resource instead of ADP used in previous planes. In an emergency 
condition, a Ram Air Turbine (RAT) provides hydraulic power for Centre system 
services.  
The detail schematics for each sub-system is represented in Figure 3-3 and 3-4.  
Table 3-1 expresses the main components of this hydraulic power system. 
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Figure 3-2 FW-11 Hydraulic System Functional Diagram 
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Figure 3-3 LEFT or RIGHT hydraulic power system schematic 
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Figure 3-4 CENTRE hydraulic power system schematic 
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Table 3-1 Hydraulic power system components list 
Item Components Item Components 
1 Hydraulic Reservoir 11 System Accumulator 
2 Fire Shut-off Valve 12 Reservoir Pressure Accumulator 
3 Engine Driven Pump 13 Heat Exchanger 
4 Electric Motor Pump 14 Return Filter Module 
5 EDP Pressure and Case Drain 
Filter Module 
15 Ground-Pressurization Connection 
6 EMP Pressure and Case Drain 
Filter Module 
16 Ground-Suction Connection 
7 Low Pressure Switch 17 Filling Connection 
8 System pressure sensor 18 Ground- charging Connection 
9 System relief valve 19 Pressure Gauge 
10 Check valve 20 Ram Air Turbine 
 
3.1.3 Hydraulic Power System Functions 
In the LEFT and RIGHT system, the EDPs work continuously when the engines are 
operating. The EMP works as a backup hydraulic power source for the EDP. The EMP 
starts when system pressure is low, or when control logic anticipates a high system flow 
demand especially during take-off and landing phases. Two EMPs in the CENTRE 
system work alternately and backup each other during every flight. The electric pumps 
in all systems can provide hydraulic pressure on ground when all engines are off. 
The pumps receive pre-pressurized fluid from reservoirs. Pump fluid output flows 
through pressure filter module to the services. Reservoir fill fluid and system return 
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fluid flow through the system return filter and then to the reservoir. Case drain fluid 
flows to the case drain module, through the heat-exchanger to the system return filter 
and then returns to the reservoir. A differential pressure indicator on either filter 
indicates filter contamination. 
Fuel-hydraulic heat exchangers are located in collector tanks for case drain fluid cooling.  
A hydraulically pressurized reservoir is used in each system to store fluid, which can 
maintain the pressure of pumps input flow at all altitudes. A temperature sensor and 
reservoir low level sensor are also installed, and are located at the correct level to 
provide a warning message.  
A System Accumulator is placed in the pressure circuits of each system. This can 
maintain the system pressure for a short period in the event of drops in the system 
pressure caused by flow demands beyond maximum displacement. A Reservoir 
Pressure Accumulator is placed in the reservoir pressure line to pressurize fluid in the 
reservoir. 
There is a Fire Shut-off Valve in the suction line of each EDP. Normally the valves are 
open. Closing the fire shut-off valve prevents hydraulic fluid from flowing into the 
pump and hence sustaining a fire.  
A System Pressure Relief Valve will open in the event of an increase in system pressure 
to a dangerously high level. Upon relief valve opening, fluid is ported to return line.  
The RAT can be deployed automatically or manually in flight and must be retracted on 
the ground. 
Low pressure switches, located in each pump output line, provide low pressure signals 
when relative pump output pressure is low. A System pressure transmitter sends the 
combined pressure of the EDP and EMP to the related hydraulic power system 
indication. All signals detected by sensors or probes are sent to a Hydraulic System 
Management Unit (HSMU) which process signals and communicates the relevant 
information through data bus. 
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3.2 Hydraulic Power System Functional Hazard Assessment 
3.2.1 Introduction  
The following paragraphs give a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) for the 
hydraulic power system architecture. The designed hydraulic power system is required 
to provide hydraulic power to all system users during aircraft operation, and to meet 
other design safety objectives compatible with the development of the aircraft level 
requirements. The purpose of this part is to perform a systematic and comprehensive 
examination of the function of the hydraulic power system, and to identify all the failure 
conditions caused by malfunction, failure to operate, or as a normal response to any 
unusual or abnormal external factor.  
The FHA also provides a starting point for more in-depth Failure Modes, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and related analyses, which in turn provide the data on 
fault symptoms needed to test the system. The FHA table is constructed according to 
SAE ARP 4761[26].  
3.2.2 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications 
To measure the worst potential effect caused by product failures, the severity of every 
potential failure mode shall be classified. The severity classification describes a 
standard for the worst potential result from the product failure. Table 3-2 lists the failure 
condition severity and qualitative effect classifications used in this thesis. A more user 
friendly quantitative definition for failure condition severity is expressed in table 3-3. 
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Table 3-2 Failure Condition Severity and Effect Classifications [2]  
 
Table 3-3 Overview of failure classification and safety objectives [25] 
 
 31 
3.2.3 FHA Summary 
The detailed analysis of functional failure conditions, flight phases, effect of failure 
condition and hazard class for the hydraulic power system is presented in Appendix B. 
Because the catastrophic and hazardous events will greatly influence the flight safety 
and system performance, the failure condition related to these two classes of severe 
events shall be pointed out for the next step research purpose. The table below 
summarizes the failure condition the severity of which is catastrophic or of hazardous 
class. 
Table 3-4 Hydraulic power System Severe Failure Condition Summary 
Failure Condition Severity 
Loss of all hydraulic power supply Catastrophic 
Loss of low-pressure warning when LEFT, RIGHT and 
CENTRE hydraulic power subsystem failure Catastrophic 
Loss of low-pressure warning when any two hydraulic 
power subsystem failure at take-off or landing  Hazardous 
Loss of ability to shut off EDP suction flow in case of fire Hazardous 
From the above table, it can be seen clearly that “loss of all three hydraulic power 
systems together” or “loss of ability to shut off EDP suction flow in case of fire” will 
have a serious effect on aircraft safety. Therefore, the research work will pay particular 
attention to analysing these failure conditions. 
3.3 Hydraulic Power System FMECA 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the following sections, a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
will be presented for the hydraulic power system. FMECA is an important method of 
system reliability analysis, and is also the basis of maintainability analysis, safety 
analysis and testability analysis. It is an inductive analysis of all possible failure modes 
of system, components, or functions and their possible effects, and determines the rank 
of each failure mode according to the severity of effects on aircraft and the probability 
of occurrence. 
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An FMECA is a systematic, bottom-up approach that traces the effects of crucial 
component failures through the system. [26] Usually, the purposes of FMECA include 
the following two elements:  
a) Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) 
It is used to identify all possible failure modes, causes and effects of the product, so as 
to detect weaknesses of design cycle and take compensatory measures for design 
improvements. 
b) Criticality analysis (CA) 
The CA is an extension or supplement of the FMEA and is based on the FMEA result. 
In order to give a comprehensive evaluation of the effects in all possible failure modes, 
each failure mode is classified based on the combined effect of severity and probability 
of occurrence.  
3.3.2 FMECA Approaches and Process 
FMECA analysis should be carried out simultaneously with system design. At the 
conceptual design phase and the early stage of the preliminary design phase, analysis is 
functional and FMECA mainly focuses on the composition of the system functions. 
When it comes to the detailed design phase, a hardware or software FMECA should be 
carried out based on each component in the system with several functions. In terms of 
the FW-11 aircraft hydraulic power system, a combination of the functional and 
hardware FMECA will be considered in this research. 
Typically, a FMECA process can be described as the flowchart in Figure 3-5: 
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Figure 3-5 FMECA process 
The FMECA process starts with system definition, which consists mainly of the system 
function description and drawing a scheme diagram [27]. The system functions should 
be identified for various mission phases simultaneously. Then each failure mode should 
be analyzed based on the functional analysis in different operational modes. The failure 
mode shall be presumed as the only failure in the complex system in each analysis 
process. Failure cause analysis aims to identify the causes of each failure mode, which 
will help in taking appropriate measures for design improvement. For each possible 
failure mode, the effects on the system level and aircraft level need be analyzed. Failure 
Severity classifications should be determined by the ultimate impact of each failure 
mode.  
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Criticality Analysis (CA) aims to classify the combined effects according to the severity 
and probability of occurrence for each failure mode, in order to give a comprehensive 
evaluation of all the effects of possible failure modes. The CA normally has a 
qualitative approach and a quantitative approach. The first is suitable in cases where 
there is insufficient failure rate data while the quantitative approach is suitable where 
failure rate data is available [28]. As the failure rate data cannot be acquired at the 
conceptual design phase of the FW-11 aircraft, the qualitative approach is chosen in this 
analysis. 
Finally, a FMECA worksheet is completed and is the core of FMECA report. Typically, 
a FMECA worksheet should include the following elements: 
a) The identification and the function(s) of the components 
b) A list of failure modes description of function or hardware 
c) Failure effects on system level and aircraft level 
e) Means available for failure detection 
f) The flight phase when the failure occurs 
g) Failure severity level 
3.3.3 FMECA Summary 
The FMECA work should be continued during the whole aircraft design process and be 
updated in different design phases repeatedly. A combination of the functional and 
hardware FMECA analyzed in this research based on the preliminary architecture of the 
FW-11 hydraulic power system. The result of the FMECA is given in Appendix C. 
3.4 Hydraulic Power System Fault Tree Analysis 
3.4.1 Introduction 
After the failure conditions are indentified in the FHA and FMECA, a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) is described for the hydraulic power system in this section. An FTA is a 
deductive analysis which focuses on one particular undesirable event and provides a 
method for determining causes of this event. It is a “top-down” evaluation process in 
which an undesirable event is formed into a qualitative logical model. [26] All credible 
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failures in next level may cause the top level undesired event should be determined in 
fault tree step by step.  
In this research, each catastrophic and hazardous failure condition should be analyzed 
by FTA based on the FHA and FMECA results.  
3.4.2 Definition of FTA symbols  
A fault tree uses a set of Boolean logic symbols to describe the relationship between 
causes and the top events caused by basic failure modes. The definition of common 
logic symbols is illustrated in Table 3-5. 
Table 3-5 Definition of FTA symbols [26] 
 
3.4.3 FTA Probability Calculation 
Probability calculation aims to produce a quantitative result to the fault tree analysis. 
Boolean algebra is used to calculate the probability of a top event for such a complex 
system. 
The basic event probability calculation can use the following mathematical equation:  
P = 1 – e-λt  ………………………… Equation 3-1 
λ = 1/MTBF …………………………Equation 3-1 
R = 1 – P …………………………… Equation 3-2 
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Where P is the probability of failure, λ is the failure rate of the component associated 
with statistical data, MTBF is the abbreviation of Mean Time between Failures and t is 
the time interval, such as exposure time or miss time. R refers to probability. [29] 
The output event probability of a gate is based on the probability of an input event. The 
AND gate output is given by: 
P(A and B) = P(A ∩ B) = P(A) P(B) …………Equation 3-4 
An OR gate output event probability can be calculated as follow: 
P(A or B) = P(A ∪ B ) = P(A ) + P(B ) ……… Equation 3-5 
3.4.4 FTA Summary 
The detailed hydraulic power system fault tree architecture is presented in Appendix D. 
The root causes of each catastrophic or hazardous failure condition are located at the 
LRU level which is achieved the required diagnostic purpose. According to the FTA 
results, it can be see that any catastrophic occurrence cannot be caused by a single 
failure. Generally, the architecture of the hydraulic power system is reasonable in this 
phase. However, the basic events failure rate cannot be obtained at this design phase. 
The calculation will be updated when reasonable parameters can be obtained in detail 
design for future work.  
3.5 Summary  
In this chapter, a hydraulic power system is designed initially for the FW-11 aircraft as 
the case of this research. Then the key parameters and crucial components are identified 
from the analysis results of FHA, FMECA and FTA. Based on these analysis results, the 
crucial components that may lead to catastrophic or hazardous failure are identified and 
the key parameters and detection methods can be obtained. The detailed information is 
shown in following tables: 
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Table 3-6 FHA, FMECA and FTA results 
Failure condition  
Loss of all hydraulic power supply 
Severity  Related component  Failure detect method  
Catastrophic  
EMP, EDP, Reservoir, 
Relief Valve, Return filter, 
RAT, 
Low pressure switch 
System Pressure sensor 
EPS information 
Parameters  pressure signal, Reservoir fluid quantity, electrical power signal, 
filter contamination indicator signal, temperature signal 
Failure condition  
Loss of low-Pressure warning when LEFT, RIGHT and CENTRE hydraulic 
power subsystems failure 
Severity  Related component  Failure detect method  
Catastrophic Low pressure switch 
System Pressure sensor 
HSMU 
Parameters  Low pressure switch test signal, System Pressure sensor test 
signal 
Failure condition  
Loss of low-pressure warning when any two hydraulic power subsystems failure 
at take-off or landing  
Severity  Related component  Failure detect method  
Hazardous Low pressure switch System Pressure sensor HSMU 
Parameters  Low pressure switch test signal, System Pressure sensor test 
signal 
Failure condition 
Loss of ability to shut off EDP suction flow in case of fire 
Severity  Related component  Failure detect method  
Hazardous  Fire Shut-off Valve 
Low pressure switch 
Engine FEDAC  
EPS information  
Parameters Valve status signal, EDP outlet pressure, electrical power signal 
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4 Diagnostics Research for a Hydraulic Power System 
The diagnostic approaches which are one of the main functions of DPHM techniques 
will be discussed in this chapter. Based on the characteristics of different diagnosis 
methods which have been introduced in the literature review chapter, Case-based 
reasoning (CBR) is first selected for hydraulic power system diagnosis. Then a generic 
CBR diagnosis process and structure are presented in depth. Based on the features of 
hydraulic power system failures, suitable diagnosis architecture for the hydraulic power 
system was built. Finally, a case study for a common failure mode is presented to 
demonstrate how CBR diagnostic works. 
4.1 Choice of Diagnostic Methods  
Rule-based expert systems diagnose faults by matching the observed symptoms to 
failure hypotheses stored in a rule base. The rule-based method is widely used as it can 
reduce the cost by increasing the availability and reusability of the expertise acquired, 
its quick response and by increasing the reliability of decision making. However, it’s 
difficult to completely translate domain knowledge into a large amount of terse rules for 
a complex system. And there are challenges in managing a large rule base and 
maintaining accuracy over the life cycle. 
Model-based reasoning (MBR) systems detect fault symptoms by comparing the 
observed data with the expected data as indicated by modelling. The MBR diagnostic 
process heavily depends on the mathematical model of objective systems. The 
efficiency and accuracy of this method is significant when used for a linear system 
whereas for a complex system, building a comprehensive diagnosis model seems 
impossible. There always lack of parameters for modelling at the beginning of system 
design, so the MBR approach cannot be applied at the preliminary phase. In addition, 
the cost of an MBR application is higher than that of other methods.  
Learning systems have ability to detect faults and diagnose failure by identifying the 
noise of monitored system operating data. However, the efficiency and accuracy are 
highly relay on the quantity and quality of monitored data, which means the learning 
systems require long term historical data record. 
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A case-based Reasoning (CBR) approach solves current problems by reference to 
solutions applied to past problems. For an aircraft hydraulic power system, a great 
amount of experiential failure data from historical maintenance information is available. 
Of course, CBR is also deficient in the establishment of a complete case base while 
compared to a rule-based system the case revision processes in CBR mean it has a 
partial learning capability. Furthermore, it can work well in some problem areas which 
are poorly understood. 
In summary, for a comprehensive consideration, case-based Reasoning system is much 
more suitable for an aircraft hydraulic power system PHM application. A detailed 
research into the CBR diagnostic approach for a hydraulic power system will be 
presented next. 
4.2 Case-based Reasoning Approach 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Case-based Reasoning diagnostics method solve new problems based on the experience 
of previous cases, which resembles the human thinking process in solving a problem. 
[34] When a problem occurs in real life, people always ask: “Have you seen this 
problem before?” If a similar problem has occurred, then the previous solution for this 
problem can be used to solve the new one. Even if this is a new problem, people always 
try to find similar problems and where possible refer to their solutions. When it comes 
to the engineering area, previous experience can be summarized as a failure case and 
broken down into its three main component parts: the problem, symptoms and solutions. 
Once similar failure symptoms are found in a case-library, reuse of the solutions for 
those problems is suggested. 
4.2.2 CBR Diagnosis Process 
The case-based reasoning diagnosis process can be organized in an information cycle, 
and is usually represented as the “4Rs” mentioned before. (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994) A 
CBR schematic illustrate the typical diagnosis process as shown in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1 CBR diagnosis cycle [6] 
When failure occurs, the features of the fault are monitored and processed into a special 
format which is defined as a new case. Then similar previous cases are retrieved from 
the case-base by a pre-set similarity function. The solutions for this retrieved case are 
reapplied to the new problem. Not all new cases can be completely solved by the 
retrieved cases. Sometimes they must be adapted to the new conditions in the revision 
stage of CBR. The solution for the adapted case will be evaluated by user feedback and 
then this learned case will be retained in the case-base. 
Compared to the other data-base method, CBR can be more accurate in identifying 
similar problems. This means that even if the latest problem is not in the case-base 
under similar circumstances, CBR can still provide useful information regarding 
solutions. When this occurs, the solution can be adapted to new problems and added to 
the case base. The case base will be improved continuously as time goes on by 
acquiring input from more problems and solutions. 
4.2.3 Constituent Elements of CBR 
In accordance with the description of CBR functions, the three elements forming the 
core of CBR can be summarised as follows: 
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a) Case coding 
b) Similarity metrics  
c) Case adaptation 
The detailed information of these constituent elements is described as follows:  
 Case coding  
In a case-based reasoning system, the cases stored in the case library are the foundation 
of a diagnostic engine. In order to improve the accuracy of similarity assessment in case 
retrieval, it is essential to construct the case properly. Normally, a case must include the 
problem and its solution. It should describe the failure information specifically and in an 
easily indexed manner. The related condition and symptoms should be considered both 
quantitatively and qualitatively in case coding. Figure 4-2 shows a simple case structure. 
 
Figure 4-2 A simple case structure [35]  
In this research, each case will be coded into the following form and stored in the case-
base. 
(Case ID) (Components ID) (S1 M1)(S2 M2)... (Sn Mn) (w1,w2，...wn) (A1，A2，... An ) (Date)  
 Where the (Case ID) is the mark of the case in the case library, the (Components ID) 
indicate the components which produce the fault, the (Date) records the time of case 
storing, (S1 M1) (S2 M2) ... (Sn Mn) describe the features and measurements of related 
failure symptoms , (w1，w2，...wn ) is the weighting assigned to the related symptom, 
(A1，A2，... An ) describe what solutions are suggested. 
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 Similarity metrics 
Similarity metrics can be defined as the basis of a case-based diagnosis. To improve the 
speed of Case Retrieval in the diagnosis process, all the measurements of hydraulic 
system failure symptoms are encoded into the most simple words ——“ 0 ”and “1” 
which represent the working status of the components. For example, (S1 1) for EMP 
indicates that the pump is operating and (S1 0) indicates that the pump is off. (S2 1) 
means that the EMP outlet pressure is low while (S2 0) means that the pressure is 
normal. 
Similarity assessment for a new case and existing cases stored in a case-base is a 
significant challenge. Generally, a failure has various symptoms with corresponding 
measurements. To measure the similarity between the old case and the new query case, 
we use a simple function given in Equation 4-1 combined with weighting factor. [36] 
S(N, O) = �wi  ∙  simi(Sin, Sio)n
i=1
 × 100%        Equa. 4− 1 
Where Sin and Sio is the symptoms of the new case and the old case, wi is the weight of 
symptom Si obtained from domain knowledge and will be updated when the case is 
successfully reused, simi (Sin , Sio ) refers the similarity of symptoms between two cases. 
If (Sin min) equal (Sio mio), simi (Sin , Sio ) =1, If (Sin min) not equal (Sio mio) or a symptom 
is only found in one case, then we define simi (Sin , Sio ) =0. 
A simplified illustration is given to show the similarity assessment as follows: 
For a new case: 
(Case n) (S1 1) (S2 1) (S3 0) (S4 1)  
The following three old cases exist in the case library:  
(Case 1) (S1 1 )(S2 1)(S3 0 )(S4 1)( S5 1) (w1=0.4,w2=0.2 w3=0.1,w4=0.2, w5=0.1 ) 
(Case 2) (S1 0 )(S2 1)(S3 0)(S4 1) (w1=0.4,w2=0.2 w3=0.3,w4=0.1) 
(Case 3) (S1 1 )(S2 1)(S3 0)(S4 1) (w1=0.4,w2=0.2 w3=0.3,w4=0.1) 
Using the metric introduced here, the similarities between the new case and the past 
ones can be evaluated as follows: 
Sim-value Case 1: (1*0.4 + 1*0.2 + 1*0.1 + 1*0.2+0*0.1) *100%= 90% 
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Sim-value Case 2: (0*0.4 + 1*0.2 + 1*0.3 + 1*0.1) *100%= 60% 
Sim-value Case 3: (1*0.4 + 1*0.2 + 1*0.3 + 1*0.1) *100%= 100% 
Based on the calculated similarity value, old case 3 is recommended as it is more 
similar to the new case than the other two cases. The similarity assessment results seem 
unreliable for the process looks very simple. However, the accuracy of CBR diagnosis 
results depends on the number of symptoms and their weighting based on the historical 
database and domain knowledge.  
 Case adaptation 
Compared to other conventional diagnostics methods, CBR has the advantage of 
solution adaptation capability. [6]This also presents a challenge. Once there are no old 
cases in the case-base providing an exact match to a new query case, the solution 
applied to the most similar case will be modified for the new situation. Usually some 
intelligence-based tools, such as fuzzy logic, neural networks, etc., are used to devise 
domain-specific modification rules. However, it is difficult to design modification rules 
for a complex failure condition. When a modified case is created automatically, there is 
a big risk in applying it to aircraft fault resolution without human intervention. Adaption 
mechanism may be given an incorrect or invalid solution update. In this research, the 
author tends to revise case by seeking expert advice for which would be more easily 
achieved. 
4.3 Design of CBR for a Hydraulic Power System 
Based on the function and the constituent elements of the CBR diagnostics method, a 
CBR framework for systems is sketched for the hydraulic power system. Figure 4-3 
illustrates the detailed diagnosis workflow. 
As shown in the chart, a typical diagnostic process can be described as follows: 
 Step 1: System monitoring 
The diagnosis process starts with real-time monitoring of the hydraulic system. All the 
system operating conditions observed by sensors and relative signals are transferred into 
the computer for signal diagnosis processing.  
 Step 2: Case Retrieval 
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When the abnormal signals are detected, a set of cases related to this fault symptom are 
retrieved from the case library. 
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Figure 4-3 CBR Diagnostics workflow for hydraulic power system 
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 Step 3: Similarity matching 
Based on each retrieved case and coding rule, the failure features are coded into a query 
case. Using similarity metrics, the similarity of cases is calculated and sequenced. 
 Step 4: Reuse case  
If a case is matched exactly, then the corresponding solution will be recommended for 
this situation. This case success rate will be updated after the maintenance feedback has 
confirmed the outcome of applying this solution. 
 Step 5: Case adaption 
If no exact match can be retrieved or if the maintenance feedback indicates that the 
proposed case does not provide a solution to this problem, a new fault warning will be 
issued and expert assistance sought. Simultaneously, the most similar cases with 
solutions will be suggested to the adaption process in order to revise the solutions.  
 Step 6: Retain case 
If the problem is successfully solved by the modified solution, then it will be retained as 
a new case and saved in case-base. Otherwise if the solution fails, the case adaption 
mechanism will seek expert help again. 
4.4 Case study 
In this section, a case study based on an Electric Motor Pump is presented to validate 
the CBR diagnosis approach discussed in the previous section. In this research, the 
author focuses on system level diagnosis in which the failure symptoms detection is 
based on functional and safety analysis. The LRU will be replaced after making the 
diagnosis. It can be seen from the FHA and FMEAC analysis result that the EMP plays 
an essential role in the FW-11hydraulic power system. Therefore, a failure mode of an 
EMP is selected for the case study.  
4.4.1 Introduction to EMP 
Four EMPs are employed in the FW-11 hydraulic power system, in which two large 
power alternating current motor pumps (ACMP) work continuously in the CENTRE 
subsystem at a pressure of 5000 pis. A typical external view of an electric motor pump 
and an internal view of the pump are shown in Figure 4-4 and 4-5.  
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Figure 4-4 AC Motor pump [43] 
 
Figure 4-5 Cross section view of piston pump [44] 
The ACMP is a complex electromechanical product consisting of a variable delivery-
constant pressure piston pump and an alternating current motor. The pump is composed 
of an inlet boost impeller, a revolving cylinder barrel containing several pistons, 
bearings and a set of valves while the motor is also a complex piece of electro-
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machinery. According to the statistics reported in previous publications, seal leakage, 
bearing and piston wearing and motor failure are major causes of pump faults. [37]The 
failure effects on the function of the pump are primarily a loss of output flow or 
overheating.  
4.4.2 Pump Failure Analysis and Detection 
Based on the failure modes effects analysis result, a summary of EMP failure modes is 
shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Summary of FHA, FMEA 
Failure modes Cause of failure Effects on system 
Loss of output 
flow 
Bearing or piston failures 
Motor failure to drive 
Loss of relative subsystem 
EMP output flow 
Internal leak Seal aging or degradation,  
Corrosion 
Reduced relative EMP output 
flow 
External leak Case crack, 
Seal failure 
Loss of relative subsystem 
EMP output flow, reduce 
system fluid quantity 
Pump Overheat Dry running, 
Wearing or abrasion 
Case drain port blockage 
Seal failure and fluid leakage 
Motor overheat Short-circuit, 
Defective motor winding  
Loss of relative EMP output 
flow 
Comments: The failure modes and causes are listed briefly for a system level 
diagnosis consideration. The real causes of EMP failure at LRU level are actually 
more complicated. 
To detect these failure features, a set of sensors and probes are employed in system 
monitoring. 
However, pump failures cannot be determined simply by these sensor signal failures. 
The operating conditions of other components and environmental conditions associated 
with this pump should be considered in any CBR diagnosis. In addition, Fault Tree 
Analysis may contribute to define these factors. 
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Table 4-2 Pump failure detection 
Failure modes Detection Sensor designation 
Loss of output 
flow 
Pressure  
Flow rate 
Low Pressure Switch in 
pressure outlet 
System Pressure Sensor  
Internal leak Pressure  
Outlet flow rate  
Low Pressure Switch in 
pressure outlet 
External leak Reservoir fluid quantity Low Pressure Switch,  
Reservoir Low-level Sensor 
Pump overheat Temperature  Temperature Sensor in pump 
case port 
Motor overheat Temperature Temperature Sensor in motor 
Current sensor 
4.4.3 Diagnostic Process  
A pump failure mode “Loss of EMP1 output flow” is selected for CBR diagnosis 
process. Using the fault tree analysis and system function, the symptom of “pump fails 
to output” can be detected from the following signals: suction pressure of pump, outlet 
pressure of pump, reservoir fluid quantity and EMP 1 Contactor Switch signal. 
As shown in Figure 4-6，a case structure of this failure mode and the case-base index is 
outlined. Table 4-3 lists the sensors and features that may appear in this diagnostic 
process  
The following diagnosis processes are based on the supposition that all of the sensors 
work correctly and the signals acquired from the data bus reflect the actual status. 
a) When EMP1 fails to output, an abnormal pressure signal in the EMP1 outlet is 
detected by the EMP1 Low Pressure Switch. The feature signal of “pressure is low” 
is converted into case form— “(F019, 1)” in the diagnosis processor. 
b) A set of cases with the appropriate symptoms are retrieved from the case-base as 
shown in Figure 4-6.  
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Figure 4-6 Examples of case-base and the EMP failure Case-structure 
Table 4-3 Sensors and features look up table 
Feature 
ID Name 
Measurements 
Description 
F001 EMP 1 Contactor Switch signal 
 Switch ON=1,  
Switch OFF=0 
F002 EMP 2 Contactor Switch signal 
 Switch ON=1,  
Switch OFF=0 
… … … 
F005 LEFT Reservoir Low-level Sensor <15%=1,>15%=0 
F006 CENTRE Reservoir Low-level Sensor <15%=1,>15%=0 
F007 RIGHT Reservoir  Low-level Sensor <15%=1,>15%=0 
F008 LEFT Reservoir Pressure Sensor <400 psi=1,>400psi%=0 
… … … 
F011 Temperature sensor in EMP1 Motor 
Overheat =1, 
 Normal =0, 
F013 Temperature sensor in EMP1 case drain port 
Overheat =1,  
Normal =0, 
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Feature 
ID Name 
Measurements 
Description 
… … … 
F018 EDP1 Low Pressure Switch  Low Pressure =1, Normal =0, 
F019 EMP1 Low Pressure Switch  Low Pressure =1, Normal =0, 
… … … 
c) Using the coding rule mentioned previously, the query case is coded and compared 
in turn with each retrieved case. An example of similarity assessment is given 
below: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The retrieved case C1031 is stored in the case-base as follows: 
(C1031) (F001, 1) (F008, 0) (F008, 0) (F019, 1) (0.2, 0.3, 0.1, 0.4) 
This indicates that the electric power for EMP1 is normal, the fluid quantity is 
not low, the pressure of pump input flow is normal and the pressure of pump 
outlet flow is low. 
The corresponding query case coding is as follow: 
(Case q1) (F001, 1) (F008, 0) (F008, 0) (F019, 1) 
Running the similarity assessment: 
Sim-value=(1*0.2 + 1*0.3 + 1*0.1 + 1*0.4) *100%= 100% 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
d) The result means that case C1031 closely matches the query case, so solution of 
C1031 is recommended as the proposed solution. 
e) Receive the maintenance feedback. If the problem is solved successfully, case 
C1031 is confirmed and the success rate will be updated in the case-base. 
4.5 Summary and Discussion 
In this paper, a diagnostics approach for a hydraulic power system is developed, using 
the case-based reasoning method. The constituent elements of CBR are discussed 
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specifically and a diagnosis workflow is developed for the hydraulic power system. An 
EMP failure mode was chosen as a case study to demonstrate the diagnosis process in 
detail. Using the CBR method, the cause of failure is diagnosed by matching the 
detected symptoms with past cases. Appropriate solutions are recommended to solve the 
new problem. It can be seen that learning capability is a very important feature of CBR. 
With the case base being updated, the accuracy and confidence of diagnosis will 
gradually increase.  
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5 Prognostic Research for Hydraulic Power 
System 
In this chapter, the author intends to apply prognosis approaches to the hydraulic power 
system. Firstly, a comparison and discussion of three commonly used prognostic 
methods are presented. Then the suitable approaches are recommended for the hydraulic 
system components based on their failure characteristics analysis. Finally, a discussion 
of the case study is given briefly due to limited time.  
5.1 Prognostics Methods Investigation 
Knowing how to detect the failure symptoms accurately at a very early stage so as to 
predict the remaining useful life of systems or components is a great challenge to the 
PHM system designer. Therefore, some people refer to prognostic as the Achilles’ heel 
of the PHM system. [6] The following figure illustrates the main goal of the prognosis 
as well as the difference between it and the diagnosis already discussed.  
 
Figure 5-1 Failure Progression Timeline [38] 
In accordance with different condition and failure features, varied prognosis approaches 
are suitable for different products and situations. Three prognostic methods widely used 
for aircraft systems will be presented in turn as follows.  
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Model-based approaches employ a dynamic model of an objective system or component, 
to predict the RUL by checking the simulation results against the observed real output 
data. It is a very popular prognosis method due to its higher prediction accuracy in 
recent years, especially for linear systems. An accurate mathematical model is required 
for a model-based prognostic application. Simultaneously, lots of sensors need to be 
used to monitor the corresponding input and output data. Therefore, the cost of model-
based prognosis for a complex system is a restriction also. 
Probability-based approaches are widely used in such a situation: there is less detailed 
information of system to build mathematical model but lots of historical statistical data 
from previous failures. It is a basic prognosis method which can give confidence 
boundaries regarding the prediction results. Normally, the cost is the lowest compared 
to other methods. However, the precision and accuracy of the prognosis need be 
improved. A statistical reliability and usage-based approach are usually employed to 
predict the RUL of these components which have lower failure rates and fewer sensed 
parameters associated with them.  
Data-driven prediction methods are used when a dynamic system model is not easily 
established because of the many signals which may indicate the failure. In such instance, 
Data-driven approaches are employed to form special algorithms which can provide the 
relationship between the desired output and multi-inputs. One of the most popular Data-
driven prognostics is artificial neural networks (ANN) which has been introduced in 
chapter 2. Compared to the above two methods, this approach uses the available data 
most efficiently to obtain fault prediction as well as the related confidence limits.[6]  
As shown in the above discussion of the characteristics of different prognostic 
approaches, choosing the appropriate methods needs a comprehensive consideration of 
system features and costs. An example of the application of these methods in a gas 
turbine performance prognosis is illustrated in Figure 5-2. It can be seen that no one 
prognostic method can be used for all systems or components. Different choices of 
prognosis approach are selected for the different monitored elements based on their 
features.  
 55 
 
Figure 5-2 Prognosis Approaches Application [2] 
5.2 Prognostic Application for Hydraulic Power system 
Based on the characteristics and cost considerations, these prognosis approaches are 
suitable for different types of components. Hydraulic power systems consist of different 
types of components, such as pumps, valves, filters and sensors. As for most valves and 
accumulators, they are totally mechanical products and no signals can reflect their state 
of health directly. Simultaneously, these components always provide higher reliability, 
the Probability-based approach based on historical data or maintenance experience is an 
appropriate prognostic method in these cases.  
Though the contamination of a filter module can be detected by differential pressure 
indicators, the other failure modes are not easily found. A Probability-based approach is 
suitable for them as well.  
In addition, in the case of other mechanical components, such as pumps, fire shut-off 
valves and Heat Exchanger, lots of sensors can be used to monitor their operational 
performances for they are critical elements of the system. So a fusion Model-based and 
Data-driven prognostic approach is a desirable choice for them.  
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With regard to the electronic components, one of the data-driven methods, ANN is a 
reasonable approach because of the difficulty in modelling these components. In 
conclusion, the hydraulic power system prognostic approaches are summarized as 
follow: 
Table 5-1 Hydraulic power system prognostic methods 
Components  Type  Detection methods Prognostic 
approach 
System relief valve, 
System Accumulator, 
Reservoir Pressure 
Accumulator, Ground-
Pressurization Connection, 
Ground-Suction 
Connection, Filling 
Connection, Ground- 
charging Connection, 
Reservoir, Pressure 
Gauge, Auto Bleed Valve 
Mechanical None Probability-based 
approach 
EDP Pressure and Case 
Drain Filter Module, EMP 
Pressure and Case Drain 
Filter Module, Return 
Filter Module,  
Mechanical Filter differential 
pressure indicator 
Probability-based 
approach 
Heat Exchanger, 
Engine driven pump, 
Ram Air Turbine 
Mechanical Low Pressure 
Switch, System 
Pressure Sensor,  
Temperature 
Sensor, 
Fusion prognostic 
with Model-based 
& Data-driven 
Electric Motor Pump, 
Fire Shut-off Valve  
Electromecha
nical 
Low Pressure 
Switch, System 
Pressure Sensor,  
Temperature 
Sensor, HSMU 
Fusion prognostic 
with Model-based 
& Data-driven 
Low Pressure Switch, 
System Pressure Sensor, 
Reservoir Temperature 
Sensor,  
Reservoir low level sensor 
Electronic HSMU ANN 
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5.3 Case Discussion  
As the pumps are widely recognized to be the most critical components in hydraulic 
power systems, the author intends to continue with this case study for pump failure 
prediction.[40] Unfortunately, it is hard to finish this case study completely due to 
limited time and a shortage of data. However, several aspects of hydraulic power system 
prognostic approaches are discussed here.  
a) PUMP Failure Feature Analysis  
 Performance degradation (Low Bandwidth signals) Analysis 
The remaining useful life of the pump can be predicted by analyzing performance 
degradation. As the pump pressure, flow speed, and the fluid viscosity parameters 
are given, a model-based approach can be established to simulate the pumps output 
performance characteristics using the real-time input values. By comparing the 
simulation results with the actual output data, the evidence of increasing internal 
leakage due to wear can be identified 
 Dynamic (High Bandwidth signals) Analysis 
On the other hand, the anomalous features can be extracted by analyzing the high 
frequency signals in pump pressure flow and case drain flow data. In this way, the 
data process uses the high bandwidth part of signals instead of their mean value. 
Normally, ANN or fuzzy logic approaches are employed to solve the prediction 
problem in uncertain situations. In addition, the vibration signal of bearing can 
reflect the damage progression directly. [17] [30] 
b) Fusion prognostic process 
In accordance with the above discussion, a fusion prognosis workflow is established to 
estimate the remaining use life (RUL) of pumps by detecting the potentially intermittent 
faults and any abnormal behaviour. 
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Figure 5-3 A fusion prognosis workflow for pumps 
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As shown in figure 5-3, the prognosis process begins with the system real-time 
monitoring which is the same as the diagnosis process. Simultaneously, a health 
baseline to identify the input healthy status of components or systems must first be 
determined. The baseline can be a composed of the various operating conditions 
collected from the system when performing normally or the threshold value from the 
standards and specifications. By comparing the monitored states signals with the 
baseline parameters, the anomalous signals will be isolated and processed as the input 
of the model-based prognosis engine and the data-driven prognosis engine. As discussed 
before, the pumps’ operating signals can be the mean value or high-band frequency 
waves acquired by dynamic analysis. Through system performance modeling, the 
potential failure can be detected beforehand by RUL prediction. The unhealthy 
conditions estimated from model-based approach can be used as a part of data-driven 
input. Finally, the combined information from the model-based approach and data- 
driven approach prognosis results can provide a reasonable RUL assessment. 
c) New sensing technologies 
For failure prognostic approaches, it is very important to choose appropriate sensors for 
system monitoring. The traditional detectors used in a diagnosis process cannot meet the 
accuracy requirements of failure prediction. Some new sensing technologies have been 
developed for on-line system monitoring, such as Fluid Property Sensors 
(MEASUREMENTS SPECIALTLIES TM) and Ferrous Wear Debris Sensor (Kittiwake 
Developments). [41][42] 
 Fluid Property Sensors  
Fluid Property Sensors can measure the viscosity, density, dielectric constant, and 
temperature of fluids directly and simultaneously, and are especially suitable for 
pumps fluids properties analysis using model-based approaches. Using of this type 
sensor, the sensing components of system can be reduced which means of the 
reduction of failure mode. Figure 5-4 shows the FPS2800B12C4 Fluid Property 
Sensors.  
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Figure 5-4 Fluid Property Sensors [41] 
 On-Line Wear Debris Sensor 
This type of sensor can be used to analyse contamination of the pumps’ case drain 
fluid in real time. Ferrographic or spectroscopic analysis methods are employed in 
this technology to analyze particle size and materials, which can reflect the wear 
condition of the internal components of pumps. By combining these sensing results 
and the pump operating conditions, the pump’s remaining use life can be predicted. 
The following figure illustrates a ferrous wear debris sensor mounted on a system 
pipeline. 
 
Figure 5-5 Ferrous wear debris sensor [42] 
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5.4 Summary 
Prognostic technology has been employed in various industrial fields and plays a very 
important role in PHM systems. In this chapter, three main prognosis methods and their 
characteristics were first discussed. Based on the hydraulic power system design 
features and different types of component failure analysis, an appropriate prognosis 
approach was selected for each component. In addition, the pump’s RUL prediction 
methods and sensing techniques were discussed and used as a case study. Although 
prognostic methods have been developed for many years and widely applied in different 
fields, there still remain, due to their uncertainty and complexity, great challenges in 
applying it to an on-board PHM system. As mentioned before, it is difficult to complete 
detailed prognosis research for an aircraft hydraulic system in the short term. However, 
the basic objective was achieved as described in the above analysis and discussion. 
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6 Hydraulic Power System DPHM Architecture 
In this chapter, based on the above diagnostics and prognostics technology, an 
integrated DPHM architecture is established for the hydraulic power system. The main 
functions and the operating process will be discussed, along with the interface between 
the hydraulic power system DPHM and the aircraft level Integrated Vehicle Health 
Management (IVHM) system.  
6.1 Hydraulic Power System DPHM Framework 
Normally, DPHM systems are highly integrated, incorporating advanced sensors, a host 
of diagnostics and prognostic processing modules, related software and hardware 
technologies, human-machine interaction interface, and off-board maintenance and 
management support systems [32]. That is to say, the DPHM systems do not just consist 
of the application of diagnostics and prognostic, but also include the interface to crew 
and maintenance operators. Based on the diagnostics and prognostics approaches 
previously discussed, an integrated DPHM system framework is developed for the FW-
11 hydraulic power system.  
As shown in Figure 6-1, hydraulic power system DPHM can be a part of the aircraft 
level health management system — IVHM. The IVHM may also include other health 
management applications on airframe structure or systems, such as avionics, fuel 
systems, electrical systems and flight control systems etc. Accordingly, the on-board 
DPHM of the hydraulic power system communicates with the flight crew and the off-
board maintenance system simultaneously via the aircraft IVHM manager. 
The on-board DPHM system includes the following elements. A set of sensors and 
probers are employed to monitor the hydraulic power system operating conditions. A 
diagnostics and prognostic module works to carry out the system healthy status. A data 
base is used to stow all the required data and information relevant to the diagnostics and 
prognostic process. In addition, an interface device is needed to connect the avionic 
equipment with system managers. It should be noted that, it is impossible to monitor the 
health condition of each component in a hydraulic power system, for which may 
increase the failure probability and the cost. Simultaneously, some complex components 
integrated with sensors can provide monitoring interface directly to the DPPM system.  
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Figure 6-1 FW-11 Hydraulic Power System DPHM Framework 
The off-board system mainly consists of ground-maintenance management system, 
maintenance supports team and the spare parts warehouse. In proportion to the on-board 
system database, a database also exists in the ground maintenance management system. 
Both the vehicle health state and maintenance feedback information will be updated 
continuously. 
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6.2 Functional Classification of DPHM 
As with the DPHM system framework described above, the hydraulic power system 
DPHM consists primarily of the on-board system and off-board system. Their 
respective operational functions are listed as follows: 
a) On-board DPHM system: 
 System real-time monitoring; 
 Data capture, process, retention and transmission; 
 Fault diagnosis and prognosis; 
 Warning faults and forecasting incipient failure; 
 Recommending solutions; 
 In-flight communication with aircraft level IVHM. 
b) Off-board DPHM system: 
 Communication with aircraft level IVHM; 
 System health state analysis and recording; 
 Ground maintenance arrangement and action; 
 Expert technical assistance; 
 Spare parts storehouse management; 
 Maintenance feedback and database update. 
6.3 Operating Process of DPHM 
The hydraulic power system DPHM works when the system starts operating. The 
system and components operating conditions are monitored by sensors. The 
performance parameters will be pre-processed before being transferred into a 
Diagnosis/Prognosis module. Simultaneously, other systems or environment 
information can be acquired from the data bus.  
Based on this monitored data and related information, the system health condition will 
be determined by means of the diagnosis/prognosis reasoning engine. When abnormal 
signals are detected, the CBR diagnosis programme works out the root cause of the 
 66 
failure and recommends the solutions. On the other hand, the prognosis programme 
provides the capability to identify potential issues before they become critical. The on-
board database furnishes data and recommends solutions in real time. 
At the same time, the hydraulic power system failure warning and display signals are 
transferred to avionics via aircraft level IVHM which also takes responsibility for 
remote communicating with ground base. 
When the off-board system receives the system health status data in real-time, it will run 
certain programmes to check and confirm the failure conditions. If a failure and solution 
are clear, the ground maintenance arrangement and action will be implemented. If the 
failure condition is brand new or complex enough that cannot be solved automatically 
by the diagnostic engine, ground technical assistance might be furnished. 
Simultaneously, feedback of the successful solution and case should be provided to 
update the database. The warehouse system manages the supply chain of spare parts in 
accordance with the condition-based maintenance schedule. 
6.4 Benefits and Challenges of DPHM Application 
With the application of DPHM technology to the aircraft hydraulic power system, 
system health information will be collected and processed throughout every phase of 
operation. From pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight activities, appropriate actions can be 
taken as DPHM enables flight crew and ground serviceman to make informed decisions. 
To sum up, the following aspects are the main benefits of the DPHM application. 
 Safety and mission reliability improvement 
The hydraulic power system supplies the power to flight-control surfaces and 
landing gear actuators, which directly affect flight safety. DPHM, applied in the 
hydraulic power system, enables the crew to take corrective actions quickly, which 
may result in more rapid fault identification response. That is to say, the DPHM 
system can provide more accurate awareness to crew or operator, which in turn 
means that aircraft safety can be significantly improved. The mission reliability can 
also be increased due to more effective condition-based maintenance. 
 Cost reduction 
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DPHM applied in aircraft system design will result in a significant decrease in life-
cycle cost. Firstly, the processing and operational manpower requirement will be 
reduced due to more intelligence in DPHM to help in diagnosis/prognosis failure 
and maintenance action. Secondly, less actual maintenance will be carried out due 
to the prognostic and diagnostic capability. This predictive maintenance will result 
in a reduction in both maintenance frequency and turnaround time. A collateral 
benefit is that the cost of spare components will decrease due to fewer maintenance 
actions. 
However, the efficiency of the DPHM system depends mainly on the accuracy of 
diagnosis and prognosis results which are related to the acquisition of signal, signal 
processing and the diagnosis /prognosis engine. Although the above section describes 
several benefits, there are challenges still remaining to develop more reliable and more 
effective DPHM systems: 
 Sensing and signal processing techniques 
With the development of hydraulic system technology, sensing and signal 
processing techniques, there is, due to system complexity and the level of 
integration, a requirement for greater accuracy and intelligence capability. 
Although the development of sensor technology can provides adequate information 
on sensing mechanical performance and structural health conditions, there still a 
lack of enough effective means for self-health diagnosis of sensors or electronic 
components by means of in-situ monitoring. In addition, higher pressure and 
temperature operating conditions pose a challenge for the reliability of sensors. 
 Accuracy of diagnosis /prognosis engine 
The CBR diagnosis approach and fusion prognosis approaches are employed in 
hydraulic power system DPHM. It is sufficiently accurate and efficient to deal with 
common failures. But for a complex system, completing the case base so as to 
improve CBR diagnosis confidence is a significant challenge. Simultaneously, the 
precision prediction model and algorithm affect the accuracy of prognosis results 
directly. Currently, the higher cost of hardware and software is a barrier to 
achieving a more accurate diagnosis/prognosis capability. 
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6.5 Summary 
The DPHM system employs on-board and remote resources, both hardware and 
software, to monitor, capture, and analyze system health conditions. Based on the above 
diagnostics and prognostics research, the hydraulic power system DPHM architecture is 
established which contains all primary elements of a health management system. The 
functions and operational process are described specifically. Finally, the benefits and 
challenges of the DPHM application are discussed briefly. In relation to the aircraft 
hydraulic power system, system design with DPHM technology will greatly increase 
flight safety and mission reliability.   
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7 Conclusions and Further Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
The objective of this research was to develop a diagnostics, prognostic and health 
management approach to a flying wing aircraft hydraulic power system as an extension 
of the Group Design Project (GDP). Aircraft systems with DPHM technology will 
improve system safety, mission reliability and reduce life-cycle costs efficiently, which 
will enable the new airliner — FW-11 designed in the GDP to be more competitive in a 
future aviation market. The detailed GDP task and the author’s contributions are 
presented in Appendix A.  
In this research, a literature review of health management technology was given at first. 
By means of this review, the history and status of DPHM technology and the main 
functions were studied. Simultaneously, the various diagnostics and prognostic methods 
were presented and analyzed to achieve the objectives of this research.  
In accordance with the research objectives, a hydraulic power system was established 
for the FW-11 aircraft. All research works in this thesis were based on this hydraulic 
system. The hydraulic power system was designed to provide a source of energy to 
primary flight controls, landing gear and other utility services. In this, three subsystems 
operate continuously to supply high pressurized fluid to users so as to maintain aircraft 
safety with redundancy design. Meanwhile, it must meet the airworthiness regulation 
requirements of FAA, EASA, and CAAC. The main components and structure were 
illustrated in a schematic diagram of each subsystem. The operational functions of the 
system were also represented. 
Depending on the functional description of the hydraulic power system, a set of safety 
assessment approaches were employed to analyse the failure conditions of the system. 
Functional hazard Assessment (FHA) was conducted for the whole system to identify 
all function failure conditions and associated severity levels. The results show that “loss 
of all three hydraulic power systems together” or “loss of ability to shut off EDP suction 
flow in case of fire” will have a serious effect on aircraft safety. The failure modes 
effect and criticality analysis (FMECA) was performed for each component of the 
hydraulic power system to identify the critical components and their potential failure 
modes. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the selected failure modes which have higher 
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hazard levels was carried out in order to determine the root cause and the probabilities 
of failure. Finally, the crucial components that may lead to catastrophic or hazardous 
failure were summarized and the key parameters and detection methods were identified. 
Based on the failure features from the analyses results, a comparison of different 
diagnostic methods was performed. After that, a case-based reasoning diagnostic 
approach was chosen for the hydraulic power system. The author researched the coding 
mechanism and similarity metrics of CBR specifically and designed a diagnosis 
workflow accordingly. Using the CBR method, the cause of failure was diagnosed by 
matching the detected symptoms with past cases. Appropriate solutions were 
recommended to solve the new problem. With the case-base being updated continuously, 
the accuracy and confidence of diagnosis will gradually increase. The electric motor 
pump was chosen as a case study to demonstrate the diagnosis process in detail, which 
showed that the CBR is a reasonable solution for hydraulic power system diagnosis. 
Three main prognosis methods and their characteristics were first discussed. Based on 
the hydraulic power system design features and different types of component failure 
analysis, the appropriate prognosis approach was selected for each component. In 
addition, the pump’s RUL prediction methods and related sensing techniques were 
discussed as a case study. A fusion prognosis approach was discussed to carry out the 
hydraulic power system prognostics practically and efficiently. 
Finally the hydraulic power system DPHM architecture was developed. This consisted 
of the integration of the above diagnostics and prognostics research and the interface 
between the hydraulic power system DPHM and the aircraft level IVHM. The accuracy 
and cost of DPHM application was considered and discussed. 
To sum up, this research completely developed an integrated DPHM system for the 
FW-11 aircraft hydraulic power system. Appropriate diagnosis/prognosis methods were 
used to identify faults/potential failure quickly and accurately. Aircraft safety was 
improved significantly due to the crew having accurate information to enable them to 
take appropriate corrective action. With the capability of remote signal transmission, 
system operating status was transmitted from the onboard to ground base in real-time, 
the maintenance philosophy was changed from the “On failure or per schedule” to “on 
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condition”. The aircraft mission reliability improved and the life-cycle cost decreased. 
In general, the research objectives were achieved. 
7.2 Future Work 
As a new and progressive technology, DPHM was applied in various industrial fields 
gradually. The related research works can be broad concepts which cover various 
aspects and different levels. It is impossible to complete a comprehensive study on 
hydraulic system from top level to a detailed level in a short time. There are several 
issues which will be studied in future research:  
The diagnostics and prognostic research in this thesis focused on the system level 
application. The system failure mode analysis and detection were only concerned with 
LRU level in this design phase. In order to improve the accuracy of diagnosis and 
prognosis results, the detailed failure modes of hydraulic components and advance 
sensing techniques should be researched in-depth. 
Furthermore, the prognosis approach mainly focused on the feature research and 
recommendation of different methods. Due to limited time and a shortage of data it just 
comprised a qualitative analysis. With the development of more detailed design, a 
mathematical model could be established for critical components. The actual calculation 
and analysis should be conducted to demonstrate the remaining useful life prediction 
method. 
Lastly, the evaluation of the DPHM application was also given briefly and qualitatively. 
Uncertainty is actually a critical element of the diagnosis and prognosis approaches. The 
quantitative assessment and validation methods should be studied further. Meanwhile, 
the cost analysis of DPHM system will also pose a challenge. Although we predict that 
the maintenance cost of aircraft will be saved by using of DPHM technology, the net 
cost benefit may not actually be easily achieved. A quantitative estimation should take 
the cost of the DPHM system installation and operation into consideration in future 
work. 
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A.1 Introduction 
A.1.1 Background of GDP 
This Group Design Project is the 4th year cooperation programme between Aviation 
Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and Cranfield University. It is the first year of 
another three-year MSc training Programme of civil aircraft design. Three groups from 
AVIC will accomplish a commercial aircraft design, from conceptual design to 
preliminary design and then detail design respectively. In this year, 22 AVIC students 
work together to finish the conceptual design of the flying wing airliner—FW-11.  
A.1.2 FW-11 
According to the national strategy of china civil aviation industry, they are attempting to 
manufacture advanced aircraft to meet the huge domestic demand. As we know, the 
regional jet ARJ21 has been taken its initial flight and the single-aisle narrow body 
airliner C919 wish to be put into service in five years.  The government is also very 
urgent to design a kind of long-range and larger airliner to satisfy increasing demands of 
international aviation market.   
In the past three years, 3 AVIC groups have accomplished a conventional airliner design 
as their GDP training programme in Cranfield University. As the expectation of AVIC, 
our group attempts to design a new concept aircraft. Therefore, the GDP programme 
aims to design a flying wing aircraft—FW-11, which is a long range, 250-seat, next 
generation airliner. With the long range capability of 7500 nautical miles, it is designed 
to reach most of the major cities from Beijing or London. 
A.1.3 Design Process of GDP 
The GDP design process was divided into three phases. The main task and objective of 
each phase is shown in figure A1-1. 
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Figure A1-1 FW-11 Conceptual Design Process 
In phase I, the main task was to analyse and define the specific design requirements. 
The design group was divided into 7 teams to make a survey in following subjects: 
 General Characteristics; 
 Performance Characteristics; 
 Aerodynamic / Static Stability Characteristics; 
 Geometric Design Characteristics; 
 Manufacturer and Operator Investigations; 
 Engine General Characteristics; 
 Engine Performance Characteristics; 
After a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the collected data and information, the 
design requirements were worked out. In this stage, the author was allocated to the 
Engine Performance Characteristics team and worked for engine performance 
estimation. 
In phase II, a conventional aircraft was designed in conceptual phase to practice the 
design flow of civil aircraft. Two type range aircraft were designed simultaneously as a 
family issue.  The final characteristics of this aircraft were used as a baseline. In this 
stage, the author was in charge of fuel mass calculation and system mass breakdown. 
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In phase III, a flying wing aircraft was developed base on the same design requirements. 
A comparison of it and the baseline was given to see the benefits and challenges of the 
new concept. In this stage, the author mainly contributed to the landing gear design of 
FW-11. 
The author’s contributions and the main achievements of each phase were represented 
in following chapters. 
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A.2 Derivation of Design Requirements 
A.2.1 Introduction 
In order to gain a comprehensive design requirement, seven teams worked to survey in 
different aspects. The author was allocated to the Engine team and was in charge of 
engine performance estimation. 
A.2.2 Engine Performance Estimation 
A 2.2.1 Task 
Compile a set of estimated engine performance data tables for a wide range of engines 
which determined by the Engine General Characteristics team. These should include 
Thrust and the specific fuel consumption (sfc) as a function of altitude, Mach number 
and throttle setting. A level of fidelity appropriate to the conceptual design phase is 
anticipated. Estimation/analysis methods can be consistent with this objective. 
Finally, four engines which were widely used in current aircraft were chosen. The main 
parameters of these engines are shown in table A2-1.  
Table A2-1 Main parameters of engines currently in service 
TYPE BPR OPR 
Mass Flow  
(Kg/s) 
Net Thrust 
(N) TO 
CFM56-5B2 5.5 35.4 433.6 137940 
V2530-A5 4.6 36.4 384 139740 
CF6-80C2 5.05 31.5 800 267480 
RB211-524GH 4.3 33 729 269470 
 
A 2.2.2 Engine Modelling 
According to the engine decks obtained from Jane’s Engine Handbook, engine mode 
structure was established firstly. The models are similar for CFM56-5B2, V2530-A5 
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and CF6-80C2, which is illustrated in Figure A2-1. The engine model of RB21-24GH 
was shown in Figure A2-2. 
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Figure A2-1 Engine model A 
INTAKE MIXEESPREMAS DUCTERCOMPRE PREMAS COMPRECOMPRE PREMAS PREMAS
BURNER
TURBIN TURBIN NOZCON
1 172 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
DUCTER
19
20
18
MIXEES
16
FAN BOOSTER HPC
BYPASS
HPT LPT
MIXFULTURBIN
21
IPT
23 2222
 
Figure A2-2 Engine model B 
A 2.2.3 Simulation Result 
With these initial parameters, the engine design point and off-design point performance 
are simulated. All these tasks are carried out by using simulation software 
TURBOMATCH. Taking into account the length of report, the programme language 
and the intermediate process are not given. The following figures illustrate the 
simulation results of CF6-80C2 engine. 
Figure A2-3 described the design point simulation results, which shown the variation of 
Net Thrust and SFC with Turbine Entry Temperature (TET) change. Figure A2-4 and 
A2-5 illustrated the off-design point simulation results. 
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Figure A2-3 Variation of Net Thrust and SFC with TET 
 
Figure A2-4 Variation of Net Thrust with Altitude and Mach number 
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Figure A2-5 Variation of SFC with Altitude and Mach number 
Finally, the simulated performance characteristics of four engines are represented in 
table A2-2. 
Table A2-2 Engine performance characteristics estimation 
TYPE 
Mass Flow  
(Kg/s) 
Net Thrust 
(N) TO 
SFC (mg/Ns) 
Simulated 
SFC (mg/Ns)  
Public data  
CFM56-5B2 433.6 137940 19.1 18.23 
V2530-A5 384 139740 17.04 16.26 
CF6-80C2 800 267480 9.785 (TO) 9.63 (TO) 
RB21-524GH 729 269470 17.74 16.48 
It is can be seen that the simulation SFC data is a little higher than the value from 
publication. However, the fidelity is located within the acceptable level. Accordingly, 
these models can be used as the baseline engine to simulate the propulsion performance 
in next phases.  
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A.2.3 Phase Summary 
Seven teams collected data from geometric, aerodynamic/static stability performance, 
engine performance, manufacturer and operator aspects, made a compensative survey 
and market analysis. To sum up, the specific design requirements of FW-11 aircraft 
shall be: 
 250seats international aircraft; 
 7500 nm range; 
 M 0.80-0.85 cruise speed; 
 Taking-off and Landing at 4E airports; 
 Competitive price, Unit price less than $185 million; 
 Better fuel efficiency, 25% fuel reduction; 
 20.5 dB noise reduction; 
 Lower life cycle costs; 
 Higher reliability and safety; 
 Flexible operating capabilities; 
 Entry service 2020. 
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A.3 Conventional Aircraft Design 
A.3.1 Introduction 
As the design requirement was determined, conceptual design of a long range and a 
medium range conventional civil aircraft processed in parallel. The author was allocated 
to the Mass and CG team in this phase. 
The maximum take-off weight of the aircraft can be broken down as:  
MTOW=MOE+MF+MPL  
MOE —— Operating Empty Mass of the aircraft  
MF   —— Mass of the mission fuel  
MPL —— Mass of the payload 
The author contributes to the aircraft fuel mass estimations and system mass breakdown 
work. 
A.3.2 Fuel Mass Calculation 
In order to calculate the mission fuel mass of the aircraft, a typical mission profile is 
drawn as below. The method that was adapted is Dr. Jan Roskam’s method is a rapid 
approach to calculate the fuel mass of the aircraft in conceptual design phase. [18] 
 
Figure A3-1 Typical mission Profile 
A 3.2.1 Calculation Methodology 
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A typical mission profile is considered as follow for the calculation of the aircraft fuel 
mass. 
STEP 1: Engine start and warm up.  
The mission begin from MTO, the mass at the end of the phase is M1. According to 
empirical data, M1/MTO is s 0.99 typically. 
STEP2: Taxi.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M1 and M2 respectively. 
According to empirical data, M2/M1 is 0.99.  
STEP3: Take-off.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M2 and M3 respectively. 
According to empirical data, M3/M2 is 0.995.  
STEP4: Climbing to cruise attitude and cruise speed.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M3 and M4 respectively. 
According to empirical data, M4/M3 is 0.98.  
STEP5: Cruise.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M4 and M5 respectively. The 
mass of the fuel consumed during this flight segment can be calculated using Breguet’s 
range equation.  
R cr =(v/cj)cr×(L/D) cr×ln(M4/ M 5)  
R cr —— range  
V —— airspeed of cruise 
Cj —— cruise SFC of the engine  
L/D —— lift to drag ratio  
STEP6: Loiter.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M5 and M6 respectively. The 
mass of the fuel consumed during this flight segment can be calculated using Breguet’s 
range equation. 
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Eltr=(1/ cj) ltr×(L/D) ltr×ln(M 5/ M 6)  
Eltr —— loiter time 
STEP7: Descent.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M6 and M7 respectively. 
According to empirical data, typical M 7/ M 6 is 0.99.  
STEP8: Fly to alternate and descent.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M7 and M8 respectively. The 
calculation of fuel mass consumed during this flight segment can be same as Cruise 
segment. 
R cr =(v/cj)cr×(L/D) cr×ln(M 7/ M 8)  
STEP9: Landing, taxi and shut down.  
The mass of start point and finish point of this period are M8 and M9 respectively. 
According to empirical data, typical M 9/ M 8 is 0.992.  
Hence,  
MFF=(M1/MTO)×(M2/M1)×(M3/M2)×(M4/M3)×(M5/M4)×(M6/M5)×(M7/M6)×(M8/M7)×(M9/M8)  
The fuel used during the mission will be: 
M FUSE=(1- MFF) ×M TO 
Accordingly, some parameters need be given by the performance team, such as the 
cruise speed, lift to drag ratio and SFC in different flight phase. The airspeed of cruise is 
490kts, the time of loiter is 0.75hours.  
A 3.2.2 Calculation Results 
According to the initial maximum take-off mass and other input parameters given by 
other teams, the fuel mass for two type aircraft was calculated. Table A3-1 shows the 
final results of fuel mass estimation. 
Table A3-1 Conventional aircraft fuel mass calculation results 
Items Seats Range (nm) Mfuel (kg) MTOW (kg) 
Long range aircraft 220 7000 86426 188181 
Medium range aircraft 327 4000 65668 192415 
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A.3.3 System and Equipment Mass Breakdown 
For the system mass prediction, some empirical equations is used in mass predication. 
The author employs the method from lecture notes of cranfield university which are 
similar with the Roskam’s method. [19] 
Accordingly, the mass of systems and equipments can be considered as the sum of 
powerplant mass, fuel and oil system mass, mass of power services, mass of furnishings 
and equipments mass:  
Msys=Mpi+Mf+Mpsfc+Mfur+Meq 
A 3.2.1 Calculation Methodology 
The calculation methodology is presented as follow: 
 For the powerplant, the factor for turbofan engines to calculate power installation is 
1.3, hence  
Mpi=1.3Mp  
Mp —— mass of engines 
 For fuel and oil systems, the mass include the mass of the fuel tank (Mtank), is the 
mass of residual fuel (Mrf) and the mass of fuel system (Mfs). 
The volume of fuel can be calculated from the mass of fuel given before.  
The tank is blend with the structure of wing box. Sealing for integral tanks is likely 
to amount to about 10V kg. 
 Mtank=10V kg 
Residual fuel can amount to about 0.25% of take-off mass, which is 
Mrf=0.0025Mto.  
The mass of fuel system can be calculated as MFS=0.05M0.8  
Thus the total mass of fuel and oil system is:  
Mf=Mtank+Mrf+Mfs  
 For the mass of the APU, it can be calculated by the equation:  
Mapu=0.005Mto=290kg  
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 For the mass of hydraulics with powered controls, it can be calculated by:  
Mhyd=3.2Mto0.5  
 For the mass of electrics, it can be calculated by: 
Mele=0.75Mto0.67  
 For the mass of powered flying control systems, it can be calculated by:  
Mfc=0.11Mto0.8  
 For the environmental control systems mass calculation:  
Men=Mac+Mdi  
Mac—— mass of air-conditioning system 
Mdi —— mass of de-icing system  
Men=Mac+Mdi=0.035Mto0.88+0.16Mto0.7  
Thus the total mass of power services including flying controls is: 
Mpsfc=Mapu+Mhyd+Mele+Mfc+Men  
 The mass of furnishings includes the mass of cabin furnishings and the mass of 
seats. Since the design number of passengers is Np, the total mass of furnishings is: 
Mfur=45Np kg 
 The mass of equipment is made up of instruments & automatic controls which is 
about 250kg for civil aircraft with automatic flight system, radio & radar & 
navigation equipments which is about 1000 kg, fire precautions Mfp =0.003Mto, 
wing area is 276m2
 
and external paint Mep= 0.5s = 138kg. Thus the total mass of 
equipment is: 
Meq=Mia+Mrrn+Mfp+Mep  
A 3.2.2 Results 
All of these methods are based on empirical formula. So, the outcome of calculation 
using these methods might not conform to the real figure. The process of mass 
calculation is iterating during conceptual design phase. The fuel mass and system mass 
calculation results are showing in Table 2. 
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Table A3-2 Conventional aircraft system mass calculation results 
Part 
Mass 
(kg) 
Percentage 
of MTOW Mass (kg) 
Percentage 
of MTOW 
Long range aircraft 
Max-Seat:327 
Range: 7500 
Medium range aircraft 
Max-Seat:224 
Range: 4000 
MTOW 188181.6 
 
192415.1  
Total system mass 35960 19.11% 39983 20.78% 
Powerplant 12441 6.61% 12441 6.47% 
Fuel System 1937.1 1.03% 1685.9 0.88% 
FCS 1824.1 0.97% 1856.85 0.97% 
Hydraulic System 1388.1 0.74% 1403.67 0.73% 
Electrical system 2564.6 1.36% 2603.1 1.35% 
Accessory Drives 564.5 0.30% 577.23 0.30% 
APU 300 0.16% 300 0.16% 
ECS 1907.6 1.01% 2434.9 1.27% 
Instrument 250 0.13% 250 0.13% 
Radio 1000 0.53% 1000 0.52% 
Fire Precaution 564.5 0.30% 577.23 0.30% 
External paint 138.35 0.07% 138.35 0.07% 
Furnishing 10080 5.36% 14715 7.65% 
A.3.4 Phase Summary 
In this phase, a long range aircraft and a medium range aircraft was designed 
concurrently. They shared the same wing but different length of body. The author 
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contributed to the aircraft fuel mass calculation and system mass breakdown. The mass 
estimation process is a continual optimization. Finally, the fuel efficiency was estimated 
based on the mass calculation results. From the table A3-3, it can be seen that the 
designed conventional aircraft have a better fuel efficiency than the similar size civil 
airliner in service.  
Table A3-3 Conventional aircraft system mass and fuel efficiency 
Items 
B767-
200ER 
A330-
200 
A310-
300 
A330-
300 
Long 
range 
Medium 
range 
seats 255 303 243 335 220 327 
weight/pax(kg) 115.7 115.7 115.7 115.7 115.7 115.7 
MTOW(kg) 175540 233000 150000 233000 188181.6 192415.1 
OEW(kg) 82377 109100 79207 119931 78537 91060 
payload(kg) 29496 35048 28108 38749 25447 37824 
Payload&OEW(kg) 111873 144148 107315 158680 103984 128884 
Payload Range(nm) 5600 5656 3700 4500 7721 5391 
fuel capacity(kg) 63667 88852 42685 74320 81294 70439 
Fuel used(kg) 60484 84409 40551 70604 75604 65508 
Fuel/pax/nm(kg) 0.042 0.049 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.037 
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A.4 Flying Wing Aircraft Design 
A.4.1 Introduction 
In phase Ⅲ, a new concept, flying wing aircraft is designed based on the same design 
requirements. The author contributes to the aircraft landing gear design work. It is a big 
challenge for the author to design a flying wing aircraft landing gear. 
A.4.2 Landing Gear Design 
The landing gear design of the FW-11 aircraft in conceptual phrase is mainly considered 
in follow aspect, which is heavy reliance on Norman S. Currey’s book: Aircraft Landing 
gear Design. [20] 
1) Landing Gear Disposition 
2) Tires selection 
3) Ground Operation capability 
For FW-11 aircraft landing gear, a tricycle configuration is used as almost all of the 
civil transport aircraft. And there is no serious reason to derive from it.  
With the estimated maximum take-off weight of around 190 tons, the landing gear strut 
and tire numbers were determined based on the past aircraft data. The nose landing gear 
is composed of one strut and two tires. The main landing gear has two struts, with four 
tires per strut. 
A4.2.1 Landing Gear Disposition  
The landing gear disposition depends on various factors:  
a) Loading requirements  
b) Stability requirements  
c) Structure compatibility  
 Loading consideration  
For the loading, it is preferable to place 8% to 15% of aircraft weight on the nose gears 
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when the aircraft is on ground. However, the main landing gear position is limited by 
the aft CG location and the stability requirements; the nose landing gear position is 
limited by the structural layout.  
 Stability requirements  
For the longitudinal stability, a tail-down angle of more than 15 degree is needed. It can 
prevent the aft CG move back to the main gear when brake. [21] 
After trading off, the landing gear location is shown as following:  
 
 
Figure A4-1 Landing Gear Location 
As can be seen from the above figure, the load on the nose gear is 8.75% with the aft 
CG, and 17.4% with the forward CG. The loading range is within required limits. The 
landing gear tail-down angle of the FW-11 is exactly 17.1 degrees, which is above the 
limit.  
For the lateral stability, the figure A4-2 illustrates the design situation: 
The calculated turnover angle of the aircraft is 34 degrees, which is reasonable when 
compared with other transport aircraft.  
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Figure A4-2 Landing Gear Turnover Angle 
 Structure compatibility  
For structural Compatibility, The nose landing gear swings backward into the fuselage 
because of the nose gear is located at 2m form nose for reduce the load on it. For the 
feature of flying wing structure, there is no space under the cabin in the centre of 
fuselage. The main gears retract outboard back of cargo bay and make a little turn back 
to avoid interferes with the middle spar. 
The following figure shows the design situation and the landing gear position relative to 
the supporting structures.  
 
Figure A4-3 Landing Gear Stowage 3D Model 
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FigureA4-4 Main Landing Gear Structural Compatibility (a) 
 
FigureA4-5 Main Landing Gear Structural Compatibility (b) 
A4.2.2 Tires selection 
For the landing gear tires selection, the loading on each wheel should be calculated. The 
following table shows the landing gear loading datasheet.  
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Table A4-1 Landing Gear Loading Datasheet 
Item Value unit 
Wheel Base 14.184 m 
Distance AFT CG to NLG 12.969 m 
Distance FWD CG to NLG 11.715 m 
Load Percentage on NLG,AFT CG 8.57% 
 
Load Percentage on NLG,FWD CG 17.40% 
 
Maximum CG height 3.667 m 
MTOW 176469.129 kg 
number of main struts 2.000 
 
tires per main strut 4.000 
 
number of nose struts 1.000 
 
tires per nose strut 2.000 
 
deceleration speed 3.048 m/s/s 
maximum speed on ground 225 km/hour 
MLG maximum static load 
34467.200 kg/strut 
17233.600 kg/tire 
NLG maximum static load 
34467.200 kg/strut 
17233.600 kg/tire 
NLG braking load 
17001.928 kg/strut 
8500.964 kg/tire 
NLG dynamic load 
51469.128 kg/strut 
25734.564 kg/tire 
After calculation of the maximum load, radial tires were chosen. The following table 
shows the tire selection datasheet.  
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Table A4-2 Tire Selection Datasheet 
Item MLG Tires NLG Tires Unit 
Tire Size 50x20-20 44x16.5-18 
 
Speed 225 225 mph 
Max Load 53800 42500 lb 
Inflation Press. 195 1 95 psi 
Braking Load 77800 63750 lb 
Weight 306.4 138.8 in 
Dia. 50 44.5 in 
Width 19 156.5 in 
Rad. 20.3 18.4 
 
Aspect Ratio 0.767 0.807 
 
A4.2.3 Ground Operation capability  
The following figure and table shows the turning radii of the aircraft. 
 
Figure A4-6 Ground Turning Radii 
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Table A4-3 Ground Turning Radii 
Steering angle 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 30 29.45 58.31 29.28 16.62 
40 23.42 50.24 22.43 10.92 
50 20.1 45.96 18.31 5.91 
60 18.14 42.37 15.6 2.2 
70 16.99 39.47 13.74 0.84 
This value is within the limitation of class 4E airports which is meets the design 
requirements. 
A.4.3 Phase Summary 
After several rounds of assessments and updates, the final configuration of a twin-
engine flying wing aircraft is developed and frozen. The three-view drawing of the FW-
11 aircraft is showing below. 
 
Figure A4-7 Three-view Drawing of the FW-11 
According to the performance team estimation results, the comparison of fuel efficiency 
between the new concept and the baseline is shown as follow. Although there is little 
weak on stability operations, flying wing aircraft has unparalleled advantages in oil 
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saving and noise reduction. This new concept aircraft research work is worthiness and 
challenged. 
 
Figure A4-8 The Fuel Efficiency of FW-11
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A.5 Conclusion 
In this group design project, the author worked in a team to design a new concept civil 
aircraft. After five months work, the conceptual design of a flying wing airliner—    
FW-11is completed.  
The GDP work was divided into three phrases. At the beginning, we collected data from 
different aspects to get the aircraft design requirements. Then we finished a conceptual 
design of a conventional civil aircraft in order to practice the design flow of the aircraft 
conceptual design. After that we developed a new configuration—flying wing aircraft in 
conceptual design phase. According to the performance assessments of the FW-11 with 
the existing aircraft, it can be seen that the whole research work is successful. The final 
configuration of aircraft was frozen and will be used as input of the preliminary design 
in next year. 
Although the author made different contributions in different phases, the whole process 
was challenged and experienced. The author was in charge of engine performance 
characteristics estimation during the design requirements derivation phase. In 
conventional aircraft design phase, he made the fuel mass calculation and system mass 
breakdown for two configurations. Finally, the author finished the conceptual design of 
the landing gear for the flying wing aircraft and contributed to the poster and brochure 
design, as well as an imaginative video for the final presentation.  
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Appendix B Hydraulic Power system FHA Summary  
Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.1) Loss of all hydraulic 
power supply. 
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing  
1. The aircraft will loss flight control capability. 
2. The flight crew cannot control the aircraft continued 
safe flight takeoff and landing. 
3. All the occupants might suffer serious injury.  
Catastrophic 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.2) Loss of LEFT and 
RIGHT channel hydraulic 
power supply.  
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will partially loss of the aircraft 
controllability and those function: 
 L outer elevator 
 R outer elevator 
 L&R thrust reverser  
2. The flight crew need to take the relative procedures 
to cope with this circumstance which will make the 
work load increased. 
3. All the occupants might feel discomfort due to due 
to partly lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Major 
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Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.3) Loss of LEFT and 
CENTRE channel hydraulic 
power supply.  
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will partially loss of the aircraft 
controllability and those function: 
 L inner elevator 
 L aileron 
 R split rudder 
 L thrust reverser  
 Nose Landing Gear Steering 
 Landing gear normal retraction/extension 
2. The flight crew need to take the relative procedures 
to cope with this circumstance which will make the 
work load increased. 
3. All the occupants might feel discomfort due to due 
to partly lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Major 
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Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.4) Loss of RIGHT and 
CENTRE channel hydraulic 
power supply.  
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will partially loss of the aircraft 
controllability and those function: 
 R inner elevator 
 R aileron 
 L split rudder 
 R thrust reverser  
 Nose Landing Gear Steering 
 Landing gear normal retraction/extension 
2. The flight crew need to take the relative procedures 
to cope with this circumstance which will make the 
work load increased. 
3. All the occupants might feel discomfort due to due 
to partly lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Major 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.5) Loss of CENTRE 
channel hydraulic power 
supply.  
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will loss those control path: 
 Nose Landing Gear Steering 
 Landing gear normal retraction/extension 
2. The flight crew will take measures to cope with this 
circumstance which will increase the work load. 
3. The occupants might feel slight inconvenience. 
Minor 
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Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.6) Loss of LEFT channel 
hydraulic power supply  
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will loss those control path: 
 R outer elevator 
 L thrust reverser  
2. The flight crew will take measures to cope with this 
circumstance which will increase the work load. 
3. The occupants might feel slight inconvenience. 
Minor 
1)Supply 
hydraulic power  
1.7) Loss of RIGHT channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will loss those control path: 
 L outer elevator 
 R thrust reverser  
2. The flight crew will take measures to cope with this 
circumstance which will increase the work load. 
3. The occupants might feel slight inconvenience. 
Minor 
2）Provide 
annunciation to 
ECAS 
2.1) loss of Low-Pressure 
warning when LEFT, 
RIGHT and CENTRE 
hydraulic power subsystems 
failure 
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will loss flight control capability.  
2. The flight crew cannot control the aircraft continued 
safe flight and landing. 
3. All the occupants might be seriously injured due to 
lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Catastrophic 
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Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
2）Provide 
annunciation to 
ECAS 
2.2) loss of Low-Pressure 
warning when two hydraulic 
power subsystems failure 
Flight 
1. The aircraft will lose some control path while the 
flight crew is not aware of it. 
2. The flight crew work load will be increased 
excessively to deal with this emergency situation. 
3. All the occupants might suffer injury or severe 
discomfort. 
Major 
Take off， 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will lose some control path while the 
flight crew is not aware of it. 
2. The flight crew cannot control the aircraft continued 
safe flight and landing. 
3. All the occupants might be seriously injured due to 
lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Hazardous 
2）Provide 
annunciation to 
ECAS 
2.3)loss of Low-Pressure 
warning when one hydraulic 
power subsystem failure 
Take off，
Flight , 
Landing 
1. The aircraft will loss few control path: 
2. The flight crew need to take the relative procedures 
to cope with this circumstance which will make the 
work load increased 
3. All the occupants might feel discomfort due to due 
to partly lose controllability of the aircraft. 
Major 
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Function 
Description 
Failure condition 
(hazard description) 
Flight 
phase 
Effect of failure condition on 
Aircraft/Crew/Occupants 
hazard 
Classification 
3）Fire 
Protection 
3.1) loss of ability to shut off 
EDP suction in case of fire. All phase 
1. It may cause fire when engine when engine fire. 
2. The flight crew work load will be increased 
excessively to deal with this emergency situation. 
3. The occupants might be injured due to fire. 
Hazardous 
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Appendix C Hydraulic Power system FMECA Summary  
Component: Engine driven pump 
Function:  Provides pressured fluids 
Failure  Modes 
Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Loss of output flow Flight, ground Loss of relative EDP output flow. Decrease LEFT or RIGHT system power capability. Major 
Reduced output flow Flight, ground Reduce relative EDP output flow. Decrease LEFT or RIGHT system power capability. Minor 
Internal leak Flight, ground Reduced relative EDP output flow. None. Minor 
External leak Flight, ground Loss of relative subsystem EDP output flow. 
Decrease LEFT or RIGHT 
system power capability. 
Impact on environment. 
Major 
Overheat Flight, ground 
Cause seal failure and fluid leakage.  
External fluid spillage. 
Decrease relative system power 
capability. 
Impact on environment. 
Major 
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Component: Electrical motor pump 
Function:  Provides pressured fluids 
Failure  Modes 
Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Loss of output flow Flight, ground Loss of relative EMP output flow. Decrease relative system power capability. Major 
Reduced output flow Flight, ground Reduce relative EMP output flow. Decrease relative system power capability. Minor 
Internal leak Flight, ground Reduce relative EMP output flow. None. Minor 
External leak Flight, ground 
Loss of relative EMP output flow. 
 
Decrease relative system power 
capability. 
Impact on environment. 
Major 
Pump overheat Flight, ground Cause seal failure and fluid external leakage. 
Decrease relative system power 
capability. 
Impact on environment. 
Hazardous 
Motor overheat Flight, ground Loss of relative EMP output flow. 
Decrease relative system power 
capability. 
Impact on environment. 
Hazardous 
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Component: Hydraulic reservoir 
Function:  store and pressure fluids for pumps, radiating, remove the air in fluids, sense the fluids temperature, detect the low level 
signal of fluids quantity, measure reservoir fluids quantity 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Fluid chamber leak  Flight, 
ground 
Loss of relative subsystem power 
supply. 
Loss of relative subsystem power 
capability. 
External fluid spillage. 
Major 
Pressure chamber leak Flight, 
ground 
Loss of reservoir fluids pressure. 
May cause relative pumps damage. 
Decrease relative system power 
capability. 
Major 
Internal leak between fluid 
chamber and pressure 
chamber 
Flight, 
ground 
Reservoir fluids pressure decrease. 
May cause relative pumps damage. 
None. Minor 
 
Component: Auto Bleed Valve 
Function: discharge the air in fluid to depressurize reservoir automatically 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Auto Bleed Valve block Flight, 
ground 
Reservoir losses of auto bleed 
capability. 
None. Minor 
Seal fails Flight, 
ground 
External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: Reservoir Temperature Sensor 
Function:  provide fluids temperature signal 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Reservoir Temperature 
Sensor failed to output 
Flight, 
ground 
Unable to provide fluids temperature 
signal. 
Loss of reservoir fluids overheat 
warning message when 
temperature is high. 
Minor 
Reservoir Temperature 
Sensor inaccurate output 
Flight, 
ground 
Provide fluids overheat false warning 
signal. 
Erroneous reservoir fluids 
temperature warning message. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, 
ground 
External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
 
Component: Reservoir Low-level Sensor 
Function:  provide reservoir low level warning signal 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Reservoir Low-level 
Sensor failed to output  
Flight, 
ground 
Unable to provide reservoir low 
level warning signal. 
Loss of reservoir low level 
warning message when system 
leak. 
Major 
Reservoir Low-level 
Sensor inaccurate output 
Flight, 
ground 
Provide reservoir low level false 
warning signal. 
Erroneous reservoir low level 
warning message. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, 
ground  
External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: EDP Pressure and case drain filter module 
Function:  filtering the contaminants in fluids prevent system clogging, provide electrical and mechanical alarm signals when filter 
need to be cleaned or changed 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Pressure Filter block Flight, ground Filter loss of filtering capability, fluids 
flow bypass, Pollution the Relative 
components. 
None. minor 
Case drain filter block  Flight, ground Filter loss of Case drain filtering 
capability. 
None. minor 
Contamination indicator 
switch failed to output  
Flight, ground Unable to provide filter contamination 
warning signal. 
Loss of filter contamination warning 
message when filter block 
Minor 
Contamination indicator 
switch inaccurate output 
Flight, ground Provide filter contamination false 
warning signal. 
Erroneous filter contamination 
warning message. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: EMP Pressure and case drain filter module 
Function:  filtering the contaminants in fluids prevent system clogging, provide electrical and mechanical alarm signals when filter 
need to be cleaned or changed 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Pressure Filter block Flight, ground Filter loss of filtering capability, 
fluids flow bypass, Pollution the 
Relative components. 
None. minor 
Case drain filter block  Flight, ground Filter loss of Case drain filtering 
capability. 
None. minor 
Contamination indicator 
switch failed to output  
Flight, ground Unable to provide filter 
contamination warning signal. 
Loss of filter contamination warning 
message when filter block. 
Minor 
Contamination indicator 
switch inaccurate output 
Flight, ground Provide filter contamination false 
warning signal. 
Erroneous filter contamination 
warning message. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: Return Filter Module 
Function:  filtering the contaminants in fluids prevent system clogging, provide electrical and mechanical alarm signals when filter 
need to be cleaned or changed 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
Return filter block Flight, ground Filter loss of filtering capability, 
fluids flow bypass, Pollution the 
Relative components. 
None. minor 
Return filter bypass valve 
failed to open  
Flight, ground Relative filter output pressure 
decrease. 
Decrease relative system power capability. major 
Contamination indicator 
switch failed to output  
Flight, ground Unable to provide filter 
contamination warning signal. 
Loss of filter contamination warning 
message when filter block. 
Minor 
Contamination indicator 
switch inaccurate output 
Flight, ground Provide filter contamination false 
warning signal. 
Erroneous filter contamination warning 
message. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground  External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: Fire Shut-off Valve 
Function:  Cut off hydraulic fluid flowing into EDP 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
Failed to close Flight, ground relative EDP suction flow unable 
to cut off. 
May cause fire when failure on EDP. Hazardous 
Failed to open Flight, ground Loss of relative EDP output even 
damage pumps. 
Decrease relative system power capability. major 
Seal fails Flight, ground  External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
 
Component: Low Pressure Switch 
Function: provide low pressure signals of pump outlet 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Never indicates low 
pressure  
Flight, ground Unable to provide relative pump 
low pressure warning signal. 
Loss of relative pump low pressure 
warning message . 
Major 
always indicates low 
pressure 
Flight, ground provide pump low pressure false 
warning signal. 
Erroneous pump low pressure warning 
message for pilots. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar. 
Possible indication of pump 
failure. 
Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: System Pressure Sensor 
Function: detect system operating pressure 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Failed to output Flight, ground Unable to measure relative system pressure. Loss of relative system 
pressure message. 
Minor 
inaccurate output Flight, ground System pressure cannot be monitor 
correctly. 
Erroneous system pressure 
message for pilots. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
 
Component: Ram Air Turbine 
Function: Provide emergency hydraulic power 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Pump fails to output  Flight, ground Loss of RAT pump output flow. Loss of emergency power. Hazardous 
Fails to deploy Flight Loss of RAT pump output flow. Loss of emergency power. Hazardous 
Fails to retract Ground None. None. Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: System relief valve 
Function: prevent pressure building up to a dangerously high level 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
Failed to open Flight, ground Loss ability to relieve pressure when it 
building up , may cause components  
damage or seals blowing. 
Decrease relative subsystem power 
capability. 
Major 
Failed to close Flight, ground System pressure cannot building up. Loss of relative subsystem power 
capability. 
Hazardous 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
 
Component: Check valve  (in main pressure line) 
Function: prevents the flow will not be a cross direction  
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
Failed to open Flight, ground System pressure cannot building up 
for the pressure flow bypass through 
relief valve. 
Loss of relative subsystem power 
capability. 
Minor 
Failed to close Flight, ground Possible backflow from downstream. Decrease relative subsystem power 
capability. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Component: Check valve  (in front of reservoir pressure line) 
Function: prevents the flow will not be a cross direction  
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Failed to open Flight, ground Loss of reservoir fluids pressure. 
May relative cause relative pumps 
damage. 
Decrease relative subsystem 
power capability. 
Minor 
Failed to close Flight, ground Possible backflow from downstream will 
effect reservoir fluids pressure. 
Decrease relative subsystem 
power capability. 
Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground  External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
 
Component: System accumulator 
Function: maintain system pressure when flow demands beyond maximum output of pumps in a short periods 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Leak in fluid chamber Flight, ground Loss of relative subsystem power supply. Loss of relative subsystem 
power capability. 
External fluid spillage. 
Major 
Leak in air chamber Fight Loss of ability to maintain the system 
pressure when large peak loads. 
None. Minor 
Leak in air chamber Ground Cannot charge and the pressure gauge 
indicate zero. 
None. Minor 
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Component: Reservoir pressure accumulator 
Function: maintain reservoir pressure when there is a demands  
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Leak in fluid chamber Flight, ground Loss of relative subsystem power supply. Loss of relative subsystem 
power capability. 
External fluid spillage. 
Major 
Leak in air chamber Fight Loss of ability to maintain the reservoir 
fluids pressure when large peak loads, 
Cannot charge  on ground and the 
pressure gauge indicate zero. 
None. Minor 
Leak in air chamber Ground  None. Minor 
 
Component: Heat exchanger 
Function: transfer heats of fluids to maintain a safety temperature 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Block in hydraulic line Flight, ground Over temperature of relative subsystem 
fluid. 
None. Minor 
External leak Flight, ground Decrease relative subsystem power 
capability. 
Decrease relative subsystem 
power capability. 
External fluid spillage may 
contaminate fuel and effect fuel 
system safety. 
Major 
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Component: Ground-Pressurization connection 
Function: port for ground pressure supply  
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Valve fails to open Ground Loss of ground pressure supply 
capability. 
None. Minor 
Valve fails to close Ground Possible fuel spillage. Possible fuel spillage. Minor 
 
Component: Ground-Suction connection 
Function: port for ground power connect 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Valve fails to open Ground Loss of ground pressure supply 
capability. 
None. Minor 
Valve fails to close Ground Possible fuel spillage. Possible fuel spillage. Minor 
 
Component: Filling connection 
Function: port for filling fluid into reservoirs 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Valve fails to open Ground Loss of reservoir filling capability. None. Minor 
Valve fails to close Ground Possible fuel spillage. Possible fuel spillage. Minor 
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Component: Ground- charging connection 
Function: port for charging the accumulator 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
Valve fails to open Ground Loss of accumulator charging capability. None. Minor 
Valve fails to close Ground Relative accumulator loss pressure. None. Minor 
 
Component: pressure gauge 
Function: port for charging the accumulator 
Failure  Modes Flight 
phase 
Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity 
level 
fails to indicate the 
pressure 
Ground Loss of information of accumulator 
pressure for operator. 
None. Minor 
inaccurate indicate the 
pressure 
Ground Loss of information of accumulator 
pressure for operator. 
None. Minor 
External leak All phase Relative accumulator loss pressure. None. Minor 
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Component: Reservoir Quantity Gauge 
Function: indicate the fluids quantity of reservoir 
Failure  Modes Flight phase Effects on system Effects on Aircraft Severity level 
Fails to indicate the fluids 
quantity of reservoir 
Ground Loss of information of fluids quantity of 
reservoir for operator. 
None. Minor 
Inaccurate indicate the 
fluids quantity of reservoir 
Ground Loss of information of fluids quantity of 
reservoir for operator. 
None. Minor 
Seal fails Flight, ground  External leak through the spar.  Impact on environment. Minor 
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Appendix D Hydraulic Power system FTA Summary  
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Loss of all hydraulic 
power supply 
Loss of  EDP1 
Channel output flow
Loss of RIGHT channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Loss of  EMP1 
channel output flow
Loss of  two Pumps  
output flow
Loss of LFET channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Loss of CENTRE channel 
hydraulic power supply 
 
System relief 
valve fail to 
close
Rupture of
hydraulic tube
Leak or 
rupture of 
reservoir 
External leak 
Of return 
filter
Check valve 
fails to open
The
 same as 
LFET 
Reservoir 1’s fluid 
falls to low level
EDP1 fail
Engine 1 
failure to 
drive
Loss of
electrical 
power
EMP1 fail
 Fire shut off 
valve fail to 
open
 External leak 
of system 
relief valve
Pressure filter 
block
Pressure filter 
block
 
Loss of all hydraulic power supply (1) 
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Loss of CENTRE channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Loss of  two Pumps  
output flow
 
System relief 
valve fail to 
close
Rupture of
hydraulic tube
leak or 
rupture of 
reservoir 
External leak 
Of return 
filter
Check valve 
fails to open
Reservoir 3’s fluid 
falls to low level
 External leak 
of system 
relief valve
Loss of  EMP3   
channel output flow
Loss of
electrical 
power
EMP3 fail Pressure filter block
Loss of  EMP4  
channel output flow
Loss of  RAT  
output flow
RAT fail
Loss of RAT 
extension 
signal
Loss of 
emergency 
electric power
The
 same as 
EMP3 
 
Loss of all hydraulic power supply (2)
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Loss of low-Pressure warning when LEFT, RIGHT and CENTRE hydraulic power subsystem failure
Low pressure 
switch fails to 
output
Loss of 
excitation 
signal for 
sensor
Loss of low-Pressure 
warning from RIGHT 
hydraulic power subsystem
Loss of low-Pressure 
warning from LEFT 
hydraulic power subsystem
Loss of low-Pressure 
warning from CENTRE 
hydraulic power subsystem
The
 same as 
CENTRE
The
 same as 
CENTRE
Loss of  EMP3 low 
pressure warning signal
Loss of  CENTRE hydraulic 
power subsystem pressure data
System 
Pressure 
sensor fails to 
output
Loss of 
excitation 
signal for 
sensor
Loss of  EMP4 low 
pressure warning signal
The
 same as 
EMP3
Loss of RIGHT channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Loss of LFET channel 
hydraulic power supply 
Loss of CENTRE channel 
hydraulic power supply 
 
Loss of low-Pressure warning when LEFT, RIGHT and CENTRE hydraulic power subsystems failure
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Loss of ability to shut off EDP suction in case of fire
Fire shutoff
valve fails to close
Fails to close
Loss of  
control signal
Loss of  
electric power
Engine fire
Fire shutoff
valve failure
Internal leak
 
 
 Loss of ability to shut off EDP suction flow in case of fire 
 
 
 
